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Between January 2016 and April 2018, New York issued almost 1.7 
million driver’s license suspensions for traffic debt—nonpayments of 
traffic tickets and nonappearances in traffic court.1  
As this paper demonstrates, traffic debt suspensions disproportionately 
harm communities of color in New York. Traffic debt suspensions force 
people to make an impossible choice: stop driving—and lose access to 
work, childcare, health care, food, and other basic necessities—or keep 
driving, and risk criminal charges, more unaffordable fines and fees, 
and even incarceration. License-for-payment laws ultimately create 
conditions that parallel modern-day debtor’s prisons.
For these reasons, the New York Law School (NYLS) Racial Justice 
Project urges New York lawmakers to support the Driver’s License 
Suspension Reform Act (Senate Bill S5348A), which would end 
suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets and nonappearances  
in traffic court, practices which unduly target and harm communities  
of color.






Stops, Fines, Fees, 
and Unjust Debts
See the full report for detailed references.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
Traffic debt suspensions disproportionately harm New Yorkers of color, and will continue to do so if the 
current law remains unchanged. In New York City, the driver’s license suspension rate in the 10 ZIP codes 
with the highest concentrations of people of color is two-and-a-half times higher than in the ZIP codes with 
the most concentrated white populations. Outside of New York City, the disparity is even more extreme: The 
suspension rate in the 10 ZIP codes with the highest concentrations of people of color is four times higher 
than in the 10 ZIP codes with the most concentrated white populations.2
The racial disparity in suspension rates is consistent with data demonstrating racially disproportionate 
traffic enforcement among communities of color. Although statewide data is not available,3 state police 
data compiled in seven New York counties, as well as data from Suffolk County and Buffalo, show that people 
of color are disproportionately stopped by law enforcement. For example, in 2017, Black individuals accounted 
for 31.38 percent of the New York State Police’s traffic stops in Monroe County, yet made up just 14.4 percent 
of the county’s population. In 2018, Black individuals accounted for 17.69 percent of the Suffolk County Police 
Department’s traffic stops, yet made up just 7.2 percent of the county’s population.4
New Yorkers of color are also disproportionately ticketed, arrested, charged, and convicted for traffic violations 
and driving on suspended licenses. For instance, drivers who reside in predominantly Black ZIP codes in Buffalo 
are at least eight times as likely to be issued multiple tickets at a single traffic stop or checkpoint than those 
who live in predominantly white ZIP codes. In New York City—where driving with a suspended license was the 
fourth most charged crime in 2018—76 percent of the drivers are white, yet 80 percent of those arrested for 
driving with a suspended license in 2018 were Black or Latinx.5 Data from outside New York State corroborate 
these staggering racial disparities. Across the country, Black drivers are 20 percent more likely to be pulled 
over than white drivers.6 Similarly, between 2011 and 2016 in Washington, D.C., 80 percent of the drivers 
whose licenses were suspended for nonpayment of traffic tickets were Black—and there were even greater 
racial disparities among those who were arrested for driving with a suspended license.7
This disproportionate traffic enforcement in communities of color is unrelated to traffic safety. It serves 
to finance state and municipal operations, especially as state and local governments have become increasingly 
dependent on revenue generated through traffic violations.8 In 2017, New York’s justice courts, which primarily 
handle traffic violations and minor offenses, collected nearly $250 million in revenues through fines, fees, and 
other exactions. Three local governments on Long Island are even more reliant on fines and fees than Ferguson, 
Missouri, which the U.S. Department of Justice criticized for its overreliance on ticket-related revenue.9
The consequences of traffic debt suspensions are disastrous, entrenching people in a debt trap. Poverty 
makes it difficult—if not impossible—for suspended drivers to pay off the fines and fees underlying their 
driver’s license suspensions. Indeed, research shows that the suspension rate in New York’s 10 poorest ZIP 
codes is nearly nine times higher than the suspension rate in the 10 wealthiest ZIP codes.10
 2  See infra Section II.
 3  See infra Section V. 
 4  See infra Section III.a.i.
 5  See infra Section III.b.i.
 6  See infra Section III.b.ii.
 7   Kathryn Zickuhr, Applying a racial equity lens to fines and fees in the District of Columbia, D.C. POLICY CENTER (Apr. 22, 2019), 
https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publications/racial-equity-fines-fees/#_ftnref22. Likewise, a 2015 study showed that in Virginia, 
Black drivers represented nearly 50 percent of the drivers who had their license revoked for nonpayment, despite Black individuals 
representing only 22 percent of the population. Danielle Conley & Ariel Levinson-Waldman, Discriminatory Driver’s License 
Suspension Schemes, ACS LAW (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/issue_brief/briefs-landing/discriminatory-drivers-license-
suspension-schemes/#_ednref42.
 8  See infra Section III.a.iii.
 9  See infra Section III.a.iii.






Stops, Fines, Fees, 
and Unjust Debts
The onslaught of excessive fines, fees, and costs threaten individuals’ ability to secure and maintain 
employment. A New Jersey study indicated that 42 percent of people lost their jobs after their driver’s 
licenses were suspended; nearly half of those people could not find new jobs. Of those able to secure new 
employment, 88 percent reported a decrease in pay. Suspensions are thus counterproductive because they 
render individuals even less able to pay off the fines and fees underlying their suspensions.11
Traffic debt suspensions also senselessly entrench people in the criminal justice system. Seventy-five 
percent of people with suspended licenses continue to drive because driving is essential for many New Yorkers 
to access basic necessities. If they are caught, they are arrested and charged with driving with a suspended 
license, which is one of the most common criminal charges in New York and around the country. Once arrested 
for driving with a suspended license, people are saddled with more fines and fees, and are often jailed for long 
enough to miss their rent payment or lose their job. This only serves to further exacerbate the underlying issue: 
financial insecurity.12
Suspensions issued for non-safety reasons, like traffic debt, create a public safety problem. Two thirds 
of all driver’s license suspensions in New York are issued for traffic debt—not for dangerous driving. These 
suspensions increase the number of unlicensed and uninsured drivers on the road and divert law enforcement, 
DMV, and court resources from true public safety problems.13
Traffic debt suspensions are an ineffective debt collection method that harms the overall economy. 
Research has revealed the practice’s negative ramifications for GDP, tax revenue, and employers. A study 
conducted in Phoenix, Arizona found that when 7,000 drivers had their licenses reinstated, GDP increased by an 
estimated $149.6 million as a result, along with increases in employment and tax revenue.14
New York’s driver’s license suspension law may also be vulnerable to possible legal challenges. In fact, 
several lawsuits challenging driver’s license suspension laws that authorize suspensions for non-safety reasons 
have been filed around the country.15 New York’s law may run afoul of “fundamental fairness,” the standard 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted to evaluate economic disparities in the justice system, and also 
may violate the Equal Protection Clause. The law additionally may contravene federal agency regulations that 
implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which could jeopardize billions of dollars in federal funding 
for New York, its subdivisions, and its municipalities. Further, if courts were to find that the Eighth Amendment 
applies to traffic debt suspensions, they might also find that New York’s driver’s license suspension law violates 
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against excessive fines.16
RECOMMENDATIONS
For these reasons, the NYLS Racial Justice Project urges New York lawmakers to support the Driver’s License 
Suspension Reform Act (Senate Bill S5348A), which would end suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets 
and nonappearances in traffic court, practices which unduly target and harm communities of color.
 11 See infra Section IV.a.
 12 See infra Section IV.b.
 13 See infra Section IV.c.
 14 See infra Section IV.d.
 15 See e.g., Conley & Levinson-Waldman, supra note 7.
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I. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) 
 
a. Overview 
In New York, traffic tickets come with a deadline requiring the person ticketed to either 
pay the ticket or appear in court or before a traffic violations agency to contest the ticket. 
New York law does not allow for a reduction, waiver, or deferment of payment, a partial 
payment or payment plan, nor community service as an alternative to payment.1 
 
If a person admits they are guilty or are found guilty by a judge, they are assessed a fine, 
and given a payment deadline. If a person does not pay by the deadline, the court or 
traffic violations agency notifies the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV), which sends a notice to the person seeking payment within 30 days. If the ticket 
remains unpaid, the DMV then suspends the person’s license. This is referred to as a 
failure to pay (FTP) suspension. If a person contests their ticket and then does not 
appear, or if the ticket requires a court appearance and the person does not appear for it, 
the DMV sends a 30-day notice to the person. If the person does not pay or appear by 
the deadline, the DMV suspends the person’s license.2 This is referred to as a failure to 
appear (FTA) suspension.  
 
Additionally, for FTA suspensions, courts generally enter automatic findings of guilt and 
impose fines, which if unpaid, become FTP suspensions—the result of one traffic ticket 
then becomes multiple driver’s license suspensions.3 When a driver cannot afford a 
traffic ticket, he or she has little incentive to come to court. Thus, poverty is a driver of 
both FTP and FTA suspensions. As fines and fees quickly accumulate, the reality for too 
many New Yorkers becomes permanent driver’s license suspension because they cannot 
afford to pay the fines and fees required to have their licenses reinstated. Among the 
fines and fees that must be paid to have one’s license reinstated is a $70 suspension 
termination fee (STF) per suspension. To have one’s license reinstated, the STF(s) must 
be paid along with the underlying fines and fees, in a lump sum. 
 
The graphic that follows depicts the process and effects promulgated by N.Y. Veh. & 
Traf. Law § 510(4-a): 
 









b. Proposed Reforms 
If enacted, the Driver’s License Suspension Reform Act would implement several 
reforms to repair New York’s broken FTP/FTA driver’s license suspension scheme. The 
Act would: 
• End suspensions for not paying or not appearing to contest traffic tickets. 
• Grant courts and hearing officers the discretion to reduce or waive balances incurred as 
a result of traffic violations. 
• Require that affordable payment plans be offered at the greater of 2% monthly income 
or $10 per month. 
• Provide notice of the availability of payment plans at the time the ticket is issued, at the 
time of sentencing, and in any communications involving the imposition or collection. 
• Reinstate licenses suspended for not paying or appearing to contest a traffic ticket, 
waiving the $70 STF. 
• Revise and mitigate the crime of driving with a suspended license (known as aggravated 
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in New York) by repealing multiple FTP/FTA 




II. New Yorkers of Color Disproportionately Suffer from Driver’s License 
Suspensions 
 
Between January 2016 and April 2018, New York issued almost 1.7 million driver’s 
license suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets and nonappearances in traffic 
court (hereinafter Traffic Debt).4 
 
Traffic Debt suspensions are strongly correlated with race. In 2016, over 679,000 driver’s 
license suspensions for FTP/FTA were issued in New York.5 Put another way, 4.35 
percent of the driving-age population in New York had their driver’s licenses suspended 
for not paying or appearing to contest traffic tickets. This 4.35 percent is comprised of a 
disproportionate percentage of people of color.6 The disproportionate impact of 
suspensions is not surprising given that New Yorkers of color are disproportionately 
subjected to traffic stops, which helps to drive the disproportionate number of driver’s 
license suspensions among communities of color.7 
 
a. New York City 
In New York City, the driver’s license suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the 
highest concentrations of people of color is two-and-a-half times higher than in the zip 
codes with the most concentrated white populations.8 The examples that follow 
demonstrate a sampling of data that show people of color are disproportionately 
burdened with driver’s license suspensions. 
 
The Bronx9 
Zip Code Percentage of Driving-Age 
Population, People of 
Color 
Traffic Debt Suspensions 
per 1,000 People 
10474 99.1% 70 
10456 98.7% 61 
10457 98.4% 66 
10473 98.0% 64 
10460 97.3% 62 
10466 97.2% 68 
10454 96.5% 74 
10469 88.3% 54 
10461 62.3% 43 
10470 57.9% 46 
10465 53.4% 46 
10464 29.6% 31 
 
4 Joanna Weiss & Claudia Wilner, Opportunity Suspended, Drivenbyjustice.org (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) 
(analyzing data from the New York Dep’t of Motor Vehicles 2016–2017). 
5 Ted Alcorn, Handcuffed and Arrested for Not Paying a Traffic Ticket, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/08/nyregion/suspending-licenses-minor-offense-money.html. 
6 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4. 
7 See infra Section III.a. 






Zip Code Percentage of Driving-Age 
Population, People of 
Color 
Traffic Debt Suspensions 
per 1,000 People 
10303 78.3% 135 
10302 62.5% 98 
10304 61.8% 92 
10310 56.4% 79 
10301 56.2% 81 
10314 34.8% 43 
10306 22.7% 51 
10312 15.9% 42 
10308 14.3% 38 
10309 11.7% 48 
 
b. Upstate and Long Island 
Outside of New York City, the suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the highest 
concentrations of people of color is four times higher than in the ten zip codes with the 
most concentrated white populations.11 The examples that follow demonstrate a 




Albany and Surrounding Area12 
Zip Code Percentage of Driving-Age 
Population, People of 
Color 
Traffic Debt Suspensions 
per 1,000 People 
12206 69.9% 112 
12307 69.7% 180 
12210 56.7% 102 
12308 40.6% 84 
12305 35.1% 89 
12303 22.8% 62 
12205 17.1% 37 
12211 12.2% 19 
12009 6.8% 20 
12186 5.6% 17 
12158 4.1% 30 
12059 2.3% 34 









Buffalo and Surrounding Area13 
Zip Code Percentage of Driving-Age 
Population, People of 
Color 
Traffic Debt Suspensions 
per 1,000 People 
14208 89.4% 163 
14215 86.4% 168 
14204 85.5% 130 
14211 84.4% 182 
14203 63.7% 92 
14212 49.9% 108 
14207 46.8% 72 
14216 25.4% 43 
14226 22.0% 23 
14222 21.7% 21 
14225 16.8% 35 
14220 11.4% 40 
 
Rochester and Surrounding Area14 
Zip Code Percentage of Driving-Age 
Population, People of 
Color 
Traffic Debt Suspensions 
per 1,000 People 
14605 88.5% 271 
14621 81.4% 265 
14619 81.2% 268 
14608 76.3% 266 
14611 73.6% 335 
14613 66.4% 300 
14609 48.6% 179 
14606 38.6% 156 
14615 37.3% 175 
14624 17.8% 52 
14618 16.2% 22 
14610 14.8% 37 
14617 11.3% 45 
 
Syracuse and Surrounding Area15 
Zip Code Percentage of Driving-Age 
Population, People of 
Color 
Traffic Debt Suspensions 
per 1,000 People 
13202 67.0% 66 
13205 63.7% 104 








13208 43.0% 67 
13204 42.7% 97 
13203 42.6% 62 
13224 42.1% 63 
13210 40.5% 44 
13214 24.4% 29 
13078 14.9% 9 
13116 10.4% 29 
13215 5.8% 17 
 
ii. Long Island 
Nassau County16 
Zip Code Percentage of Driving-Age 
Population, People of 
Color 
Traffic Debt Suspensions 
per 1,000 People 
11575 98.3% 136 
11550 91.9% 92 
11553 91.2% 98 
11003 82.4% 71 
11520 73.9% 80 
11590 58.8% 63 
11510 55.5% 59 
11542 39.6% 34 
11558 28.6% 45 
11561 22.1% 30 
11554 19.0% 17 
11530 11.1% 10 
 
Suffolk County17 
Zip Code Percentage of Driving-Age 
Population, People of 
Color 
Traffic Debt Suspensions 
per 1,000 People 
11798 91.1% 177 
11717 84.5% 90 
11722 76.3% 101 
11701 64.3% 86 
11706 62.2% 72 
11749 51.6% 74 
11713 47.1% 118 
11091 39.3% 76 
11932 38.7% 67 
11950 36.4% 100 







11944 26.1% 53 
11976 17.9% 22 
11719 16.4% 35 
11787 8.7% 18 
11739 6.0% 11 
 
III. People of Color are Disproportionately at Risk for Driver’s License 
Suspensions 
 
Nearly two thirds of all driver’s license suspensions in New York are for Traffic Debt,18 
and such suspensions are drastically compounded for communities of color. As people 
of color are disproportionately stopped, ticketed, ticketed with multiple tickets, arrested, 
charged, and convicted for traffic violations and driving with suspended licenses, people 
of color are disproportionately at risk for driver’s licenses suspensions. Exacerbating the 
risk are disproportionate concentrations of poverty among communities of color; as is 
self-evident, poverty makes it more difficult to pay Traffic Debt. 
 
a. Heavier Traffic Enforcement Among Communities of Color 
Communities of color are disproportionately policed. Correspondingly, people of color 
are disproportionately stopped, ticketed, arrested, charged, and punished. Therefore, 
driver’s license suspensions—and the associated fines, fees, and costs—
disproportionately target and harm communities of color. 
 
i. New Yorkers of Color Disproportionately Subjected to Traffic Stops 
Racial disparities in traffic stops are a pervasive problem in New York State, as they are 
across the country. This helps drive the disproportionate share of driver’s license 
suspensions that New Yorkers of color endure. 
 
The data that follow demonstrate that various law enforcement agencies in New York 
disproportionately stop people of color. 
 
1. New York State Police 
In response to the Stanford Open Policing Project’s request for traffic-stop data, the 
New York State Police provided limited information regarding 7,962,169 traffic stops 
they conducted between December 2009 and December 2017. The charts below 
summarize pertinent available traffic-stop data from the 2017 calendar year across seven 




18 Alcorn, supra note 5. 
19 Data retrieved from Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops 
Across the United States, Stanford Computational Policy Lab (Mar. 2019), 
https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/data/ and DATAUSA, https://datausa.io (last visited Dec. 31, 2019). 
As discussed at length below, New York law does not mandate the collection and analysis of traffic-stop 




Albany County percentage of population percentage of total stops 
white drivers 71.8% 66.17% 
Black drivers 12.1% 20.53% 
Latinx drivers 5.96% 5.81% 
 
Broome County percentage of population percentage of total stops 
white drivers 84.0% 68.78% 
Black drivers 5.06% 14.25% 
Latinx drivers 3.99% 6.01% 
 
Erie County percentage of population percentage of total stops 
white drivers 75.3% 71.21% 
Black drivers 12.7% 16.97% 
Latinx drivers 5.47% 3.84% 
 
Monroe County percentage of population percentage of total stops 
white drivers 70.3% 53.58% 
Black drivers 14.4% 31.38% 
Latinx drivers 8.79% 10.55% 
 
Nassau County percentage of population percentage of total stops 
white drivers 59.6% 36.91% 
Black drivers 11.1% 24.59% 
Latinx drivers 17.2% 17.89% 
 
Onondaga County percentage of population percentage of total stops 
white drivers 76.5% 70.76% 
Black drivers 11.0% 19.81% 
Latinx drivers 4.88% 3.57% 
 
Suffolk County percentage of population percentage of total stops 
white drivers 67.1% 48.81% 
Black drivers 7.35% 14.83% 
Latinx drivers 19.5% 27.40% 
 
2. Suffolk County Police Department 
Pursuant to a settlement agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD), the SCPD is required to collect data 
regarding traffic stops.20 Traffic-stop data is produced quarterly and is available to the 
public.21 
 
20 Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and Suffolk County Police Department 
(Jan. 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/01/23/suffolk_agreement_1-13-
14.pdf. 
21 Suffolk County Police Department Historical Stop Data, 





The most recent data available estimates that the total population of Suffolk County is 
approximately 1,497,595 people, about seventy-eight percent of which is of driving age.22 
An analysis of the 2018 traffic-stop data reveals that the SCPD engaged in 166,739 traffic 
stops in 2018. The chart below summarizes pertinent available traffic-stop data from the 
2018 calendar year, and compares the data to the most recent available population 
demographic estimates. 
 
 percentage of population percentage of total stops 
white drivers 68.5% 56.22% 
Black drivers 7.2% 17.69% 
Latinx drivers 18.6% 19.55% 
 
Relative to the percentage of the population that Black individuals make up, it is clear 
that they are disproportionately subjected to traffic stops by the SCPD.23 
 
3. Buffalo Police Department 
According to data obtained from the Buffalo Police Department (BPD) by attorneys 
representing clients in litigation that alleges unconstitutional law enforcement practices, 
the BPD’s Strike Force conducted more than 1,700 checkpoints between January 2013 
and October 2017.24 The data shows that nearly forty percent of the checkpoints 
conducted between January 2013 and June 2017 were conducted in three of Buffalo’s 
seventy-seven census tracts, in which the Black or Latinx populations exceeded eighty-
six percent.25 The map below illustrates the concentration of checkpoints in low-income 
communities of color.26 
 
compliance with the agreement, it has yet to come into full compliance with the traffic-stop data practices 
mandated by its agreement with the DOJ. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEVENTH REPORT ASSESSING 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE BY SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEP’T 6–7 (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download. 
22 U.S. Census Bureau, 2013-2017 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (on file with authors). 
Note, the seventy-eight percent only accounts for individuals eighteen years of age and over. This estimate 
is therefore likely under inclusive as it does not account for individuals that are seventeen years of age, 
who are legally permitted to drive in New York State. 
23 Given that only seventy-eight percent of the population is of driving age, the disproportionate impact on 
Black and Latinx individuals is likely even more drastic than these statistics indicate. If Black individuals 
account for 7.2 percent of the driving-age population (as they do for the general population), only about 
5.62 percent of the driving-age population would be comprised of Black individuals. If Latinx individuals 
account for 18.6 percent of the driving-age population (as they do for the general population), only about 
14.51 percent of the driving-age population would be comprised of Latinx individuals. 
24 Complaint ¶ ¶ 66–68, Black Love Resists et al v. City of Buffalo et al, Docket No. 1:18-cv-00719 
(W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (based on data from the BPD listing Strike Force Checkpoint locations by 
Census tract from January 2013 to October 2017). 
25 Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 68. 
26 Complaint, supra note 24 app. A (based on data from the BPD listing Strike Force Checkpoint locations 
by Census tract from January 2013 to October 2017 and U.S. Census demographic data provided by the 






Further, social scientists examined sixty of the Strike Force checkpoints conducted in 
forty-six different locations from April to May 2013 and found that of the sixty 
checkpoints examined, fifty-three—or eighty-seven percent of them—took place in 
predominantly Black or Latinx neighborhoods.27 
 
ii. People of Color Across the Country Disproportionately Subjected to 
Traffic Stops 
New York is not alone. “Racial disparities in traffic stops are large, ubiquitous across the 
nation, and troubling.”28 A DOJ report revealed that in 2011 Black drivers were thirty-
one percent more likely to be pulled over than white drivers.29 More recently, the 
Stanford Open Policing Project examined about 93 million traffic stops conducted from 
2011 to 2017 across twenty-one state patrol agencies, including New York, and twenty-
nine municipal police departments. The study concluded that Black drivers are twenty 
 
27 Andrew Wheeler & Scott Phillips, A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation Using Roadblocks and Automatic 
License Plate Readers to Reduce Crime in Buffalo, NY (May 17, 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2781126. 
28 Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes, 9 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & 
SOCIAL CHANGE 21, 22 (2017). 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, No. NCJ 
242937, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011 (2013); Christopher Ingraham, 






percent more likely to get pulled over than white drivers.30 It further indicated that 
among both municipal police and state patrol stops, Black drivers, on average, are more 
likely to be stopped than white drivers.31 
 
The DOJ’s landmark Ferguson Report revealed similarly troubling and racialized policing 
practices there. Between October 2012 and October 2014, the Ferguson Police 
Department (FPD) reported 11,610 traffic stops. Although Black individuals accounted 
for only sixty-seven percent of the population, they accounted for 9,875—eighty-five 
percent—of those stops.32 Moreover, Missouri’s attorney general recently released a 
report demonstrating that Black drivers across the entire state of Missouri are ninety-one 
percent more likely than white drivers to be pulled over by police.33 Data from other 
jurisdictions further confirming that people of color are disproportionately subjected to 
traffic stops are appended to this paper as an appendix. 
 
iii. Pretextual Stops Generally Used Against People of Color for Reasons 
Wholly Unrelated to Traffic Safety 
Pretextual stops are increasingly used for the purpose of generating fines and fees 
revenue, and have little (if anything) to do with traffic safety. Indeed, there are 1,246 
town and village justice courts which the State and its subdivisions use to raise millions 
in revenue,34 so much so that six of New York’s municipalities rank in the top 100 
nationally in terms of revenue generated from fines.35 In 2017, New York’s justice courts 
 
30 Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United 
States, Stanford Computational Policy Lab, (Mar. 13, 2019); AJ Willingham, Researchers studied nearly 100 
million traffic stops and found black motorists are more likely to be pulled over, CNN (Mar. 21, 2019, 
12:54 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/21/us/police-stops-race-stanford-study-trnd/index.html; 
Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, Study Finds Racial Bias In Police Traffic Stops And Searches, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 19, 2019, 7:00PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/White-Black-drivers-police-stops-searches-
racial-bias_n_5c916558e4b0f7ed945d4ba3; Erik Oritz, Inside 100 million police traffic stops: New 
evidence of racial bias, NBC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019, 1:00PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/inside-100-million-police-traffic-stops-new-evidence-racial-bias-n980556. 
31 Pierson, supra note 30 at 3-4. Though the statistics that informed this conclusion “do not account for 
possible race-specific differences in driving behavior, including amount of time spent on the road and 
adherence to traffic laws,” the study authors employed a statistical approach known as the “veil of 
darkness test” (i.e., the examination of stops conducted at times when it would be difficult for an officer to 
view a motorist’s race prior to the stop) to mitigate the “benchmarking problem.” Id. at 4. The results after 
implementing the technique similarly suggested that racial discrimination against black drivers informs 
police officers’ stop decisions. Id. at 4–5. 
32 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T 64 (Mar. 
4, 2015). The Report acknowledged the limitations to using basic population data as a benchmark to 
evaluate traffic stops, but found that the data was sufficiently reliable because “black drivers might account 
for less of the driving pool than would be expected from overall population rates because a lower 
proportion of blacks than whites is at or above the minimum driving age.” Id. at 64 n. 39 (emphasis in 
original). 
33 Summer Ballentine, Black Missouri drivers 91% more likely to be stopped, state attorney general finds, 
PBS (June 10, 2019, 2:11PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/black-missouri-drivers-91-more-
likely-to-be-stopped-state-attorney-general-finds. 
34 OFFICE OF THE STATE CONTROLLER DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL 
ACCOUNTABILITY, REPORT ON JUSTICE COURT FUND 1 (Aug. 2010), 
https://osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/justicecourtreport2010.pdf. 





collected nearly $250 million in revenues through fines, fees, and other exactions.36 In 
Nassau and Suffolk County, traffic court fines and fees totaled $146 million in 2017, up 
about $104 million from five years prior.37 The fifty upstate town and village courts that 
collected the most fines for traffic tickets and other violations in 2017 collected a total of 
$171 million in 2017.38 
 
Although the revenue generated by justice courts are shared between the State and 
relevant jurisdiction, the funds allocated to the jurisdiction are a critical source of 
funding for town and village government operations, supporting “budgets for police 
protection, sanitation, road maintenance, and other key municipal functions.”39 And 
disturbingly, research shows that cities, towns, and villages with larger concentrations of 
people of color fine residents more on a per capita basis and are more reliant on fines 
revenue.40 An analysis of data from 9,000 U.S. cities revealed that cities with higher Black 
populations are more likely to use fines as a revenue source than cities with lower Black 
populations, suggesting that fine revenue-generating practices unduly target communities 
of color.41 
 
The Investigative Post of Buffalo reported that pretextual stops in Buffalo were used to 
generate revenue and unduly targeted communities of color. After the City of Buffalo 
entered into an arrangement with the State that allowed it to retain most of the money 
generated by traffic tickets issued by the Buffalo police—via the creation of the Buffalo 
Traffic Violations Agency (BTVA)—the issuance of tickets, and revenue collected 
therefrom, soared. Despite the increase in revenue—which exceeded $2 million—the 
City subsequently imposed thirteen new fees that collectively added at least $100 to 
virtually all traffic cases.42 The investigation uncovered that since the BTVA was 
established, police write far more tickets for tinted windows—an equipment violation—
than for speeding or running red lights and stop signs, moving violations that involve 
true driving safety issues.43 In fact, “tinted windows accounted for [seventeen] percent of 
 
36 OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, JUSTICE COURT FUND TOWN AND VILLAGE COURT 
REVENUE REPORT (2017).  
37 Craig Schneider, Long Island finds a cash cow: Traffic tickets, NEWSDAY (Dec. 2, 2018, 7:15 PM), 
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/traffic-revenue-1.24081944. 
38 Michelle Breidenbach, 50 Upstate NY towns that collect most fines for speeding, traffic violations, NEW 
YORK UPSTATE, https://www.newyorkupstate.com/news/erry-2018/07/ab2e7d572e1626/50-upstate-ny-
towns-that-colle.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2020). 
39 THE FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, Fines and Fees and Jail Time in New York Town and Village Justice 
Courts: The Unseen Violation of Constitutional and State Law (Apr. 3, 2019), 
http://moderncourts.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Fines-and-Fees-and-Jail-Time-in-New-York-
Town-and-Village-Justice-Courts-The-Unseen-Violation-of-Constitutional-and-State-Law.pdf. 
40 See, e.g., Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race, Representation, and Revenue: 
Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments, URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW (2019), 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1078087419834632?journalCode=uarb; Mike Maciag, 
Addicted to Fines, GOVERNING (Sept. 2019), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-addicted-
to-fines.html; Michael Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation 
and Exploitative Revenue Sources (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/49a1/4a1ed2448a788cb11f70c3c4bd91f790c1ca.pdf. 
41 Sances & You, supra note 40. 






the department’s tickets issued, more than any other violation.”44 The investigation also 
noted that Black and Latinx neighborhoods were targeted for traffic enforcement. These 
pretextual stops, used for revenue generation rather than traffic safety, 
disproportionately burdened communities of color. 
 
Further corroborating this disturbing and pervasive trend of government reliance on 
fines and fees revenue is the DOJ’s investigation, which found that the City of 
Ferguson’s focus on revenue generation had substantial and comprehensive negative 
impacts. It concluded that although the City was “aware for years about the impact its 
focus on revenue had on lawful police action and the fair administration of justice” and 
“[the City] disregarded those concerns—even concerns raised from within the City 
government—to avoid disturbing the court’s ability to optimize revenue generation.”45 
Three local governments on Long Island are even more reliant on fines and fees than the 
City of Ferguson, which the DOJ intently criticized for “pressur[ing] officers to write 
citations, independent of any public safety need, and rely[ing] on citation productivity to 
fund the City budget.”46 
 
Notwithstanding patent racial disparities among the people most impacted by ticket-
related fines and fees, and the fact that the use of vehicle codes for revenue generation 
have proven to be an inefficient use of law enforcement resources,47 pretextual stops 
continue to be employed against people of color for reasons that cannot be explained by 
any legitimate law enforcement purpose. 
 
b. People of Color Suffer Disproportionately Harsh Outcomes Incident to 
Traffic Stops 
Not only are people of color more likely to subjected to traffic stops by law 
enforcement, they are more likely to be ticketed and to receive multiple tickets than 
 
44 Id. This percent appears strikingly high given that tinted windows accounted for less than three percent 
of the tickets issued in Rochester, Amherst, and Cheektowaga. Further, half a dozen motorists reported to 
the Investigative Post that when cited for tinted windows, they were given four tickets—one for each 
window. Id. 
45 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 32 at 15. 
46 Kopf, supra note 35; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 32 at 64. 
47 If not used for fines and fees revenue, pretextual stops are typically used for general investigatory 
purposes, not to ensure traffic safety. When police officers effectuate traffic stops as a general law 
enforcement strategy, the stops “have little (if anything) to do with traffic safety and everything to do with 
who looks suspicious.” Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes, 9 DUKE 
FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 21, 25 (2017). Unsurprisingly, racial disparities often ensue from 
these “investigatory stops,” and may also bear a strong relation to poverty. Frank R. Baumgartner et al., 
Racial Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes, 9 DUKE FORUM FOR LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE 21, 25 (2017). 
Correspondingly, racial disparities in traffic stops are lower for agencies who conduct traffic stops mainly 
for reasons of safety, rather than for reasons such as broken tail lights or expired tags—offenses that are 
generally disproportionately enforced against people of color. FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, DEREK A. EPP & 
KELSEY SHOUB, SUSPECT CITIZENS WHAT 20 MILLION TRAFFIC STOPS TELL US ABOUT POLICING AND 
RACE (Cambridge University Press 2018) (demonstrates through a study of twenty million traffic stops in 
North Carolina that the use of vehicle code for criminal investigation is extremely inefficient as it leads to 
very few contraband hits—throughout the fifteen-year period the study authors examined, only twelve 
percent of individuals were arrested after a search incident to a traffic stop, and explains that racially 
disparate search practices seem to happen because police tend to hold unwarranted suspicions about 




white people. Because they are also more likely to experience poverty than white people, 
they are less likely to be able to pay traffic-related fines and fees. Accordingly, people of 
color are disproportionately at risk for driver’s license suspensions and charges for 
driving with a suspended license (which depending upon the circumstances can be either 
a misdemeanor or felony in New York). This is the case in New York and across the 
country. 
 
i. New Yorkers of Color Suffer Disproportionately Harsh Outcomes 
Incident to Traffic Stops 
As an initial matter, because New Yorkers of color are more likely to be stopped by law 
enforcement,48 they are also more likely to be ticketed and charged with driving with a 
suspended license (known as Aggravated Unlicensed Operation (AUO) in New York) 
because once an officer has stopped an individual, the officer will inevitably run a check 
on the individual’s driver’s license. Since New Yorkers of color disproportionately 
experience Traffic Debt suspensions, New Yorkers of color run a disproportionate risk 
of being ticketed and charged for driving with a suspended license. 
 
Despite the limited availability of information regarding the outcomes of traffic stops in 
New York State,49 it is well documented that people of color are disproportionately 
represented in the State’s criminal justice system: Black individuals comprise forty-three 
percent, and Latinx individuals account for nineteen percent, of the State’s jail 
population.50 Further, Black individuals are incarcerated in jails at 4.9 times the rate of 
white individuals. Likewise, Black individuals comprise forty-eight percent, and Latinx 
individuals account for twenty-four percent, of the State’s prison population. And Black 
individuals are incarcerated in prisons at 7.1 times the rate of white individuals.51 
Consistent with what we know about racial disparities in New York’s criminal justice 
system, and what we know about the racial disparities in traffic-stop outcomes in 
jurisdictions across the country,52 there is no reason to think racial disparities in the 
traffic violation enforcement context do not also exist in New York. 
 
Buffalo demonstrates that racially disparate traffic violation outcomes very much exist in 
New York. Data from the New York State DMV suggests that drivers who reside in 
predominantly Black zip codes in Buffalo are at least eight times as likely to be issued 
multiple tickets at a single traffic stop or checkpoint than those who live in 
predominantly white zip codes.53 The data likewise reveals that “drivers from 
predominately Black zip codes are more than four times as likely to have their driver’s 
licenses suspended because they cannot pay their traffic tickets than those who live in 
predominately white zip codes.”54 The implication is clear: drivers of color in Buffalo are 
 
48 See supra Section III.a.i–ii. 
49 See infra Section V. 
50 VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION TRENDS IN NEW YORK (Dec. 2019), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-trends-new-york.pdf. 
51 Id. 
52 See infra Section III.b.ii and app. B. 
53 Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 85 (based on BMHA and DMV data). 




disproportionately charged and punished with traffic violations as well as for their 
inabilities to pay the fines and fees that underlie such violations. 
 
A BPD partnership between its Strike Force and its Housing Unit further underscores 
these disturbing realities. In 2017 alone, the nineteen officers on the BPD Housing Unit 
issued 14,853 traffic tickets and made 3,278 misdemeanor traffic arrests on or near 
BMHA properties.55 The racial and socioeconomic demographics of the BMHA 
properties where the Housing Unit spent the bulk of its time56 compel the conclusion 
that it is more likely than not that the great majority of the people cited or arrested were 
low-income people of color. 
 
ii. People of Color Across the Country Suffer Disproportionately Harsh 
Outcomes Incident to Traffic Stops 
The data analyzed by the Stanford Open Policing Project demonstrate that police ticket 
and arrest Black and Latinx drivers more often than white drivers.57 For instance, the 
researchers specifically found that when stopped for speeding, Black drivers are twenty 
percent more likely, and Latinx drivers are thirty percent more likely, to get a ticket (as 
opposed to a warning) than white drivers.58 
 
Moreover, the DOJ’s investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) 
discovered statistically significant racial disparities in the outcomes people received after 
they are subjected to a traffic stop. The investigation uncovered that while 8,987—or 
ninety-one percent of—stopped Black drivers received citations, only 1,501—or eighty-
seven percent of—stopped white drivers received a citation. Similarly, while 891—or ten 
percent of—stopped Black drivers were arrested as a result of the stop, only sixty-
three—or four percent of—stopped white drivers were arrested. The investigation noted 
that this disparity could largely be explained by the high number of Black individuals 
“arrested for outstanding municipal warrants issued for missed court payments and 
appearances,” which are often the precise circumstances that give rise to the driver’s 
license suspensions at issue in New York.59 Even after using a regression analysis to 
control for non-race-based variables, the DOJ investigation concluded that Black 
individuals in Ferguson were two times as likely to receive a citation incident to a traffic 
stop.60 
 
Additional findings reinforce the DOJ investigation’s conclusion that Black individuals 
disproportionately receive unfair and harsh post-traffic stop outcomes: In 2013, while 
more than fifty percent of all cited Black individuals received multiple citations during a 
 
55 Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 83 (based on BMHA and DMV data). BMHA’s population is about seventy-
four percent Black and seventeen percent Latino; ninety-six percent of MBHA households are classified as 
very low income. About thirty-five percent are under the age of eighteen, and thus are largely not of 
driving age. Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 79 (based on BMHA and DMV data). 
56 Complaint, supra note 24 ¶¶ 80–82 (based on BMHA and DMV data). 
57 Pierson, supra note 30. 
58 Pierson, supra note 30. 
59 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 32 at 64–66. 
60 This data “is not dependent on population data or on assumption about differential offending rates by 
race; instead the enforcement actions imposed against stopped black drivers are compared directly to the 




single police encounter, only twenty-six percent of non-Black individuals received more 
than one citation. And as the number of citations issued increased beyond two, the racial 
disparities grew starker. From October 2012 to July 2014, Black individuals accounted 
for eighty-five percent of the 35,871 total charges (traffic citations, summonses, and 
arrests) brought by the FPD. Further, the disparity in speeding tickets between Black 
individuals and non-Black individuals “is [forty-eight percent] larger when citations are 
issued not on the basis of radar or laser, but by some other method, such as the officer 
own visual assessment.” Of the 460 individuals the FPD arrested during a traffic stop 
solely because the person had an outstanding warrant, forty-four—or ninety-six 
percent—of the individuals were Black.61 Similar to these findings: 
 
• “In 2015, the Las Vegas Review-Journal investigated law enforcement data and 
found that residents living in the seven poorest, statistically [Black and Latinx] 
zip codes account for nearly two-thirds of traffic citations.”62 
• Between 2009 and 2011, seven in ten people arrested for traffic offenses in 
Washington D.C. were Black, and there were even greater racial disparities 
among those who were arrested for driving with a suspended license.63 
• In Nebraska, where Black people make up roughly four percent of the 
population, they accounted for nearly eight percent of the traffic stops and were 
arrested incident to those traffic stops 16.9 percent of the time, compared with 
just 2.6 percent for the general population.64 
• In Illinois, while citation rates across the state are mixed, there is “a large number 
of law enforcement agencies citing [drivers of color] at significantly higher rates 
than white drivers.”65 
• A 2016 review of traffic stops in Bloomfield, New Jersey revealed that although 
the city is about sixty percent white, seventy-eight percent of ticketed motorists 
were Black or Latinx.66 
• An analysis of one million traffic stops in Montgomery County, Maryland 
beginning in 2012 confirms these same problems exist there as well—that 
 
61 Id. at 66–67. 
62 Advisory Paper from Nev. State Advisory Comm. on Municipal Fines and Fees in State of Nev. to the 
U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 6 (June 13, 2017) (citing James DeHaven, Poor Residents Take Brunt of 
Planned Vegas Muni Court Payments, L.V. REV. J. (June 15, 2015), 
https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/poor-residents-take-brunt-of-planned-vegas-muni-
courtpayments. 
63 Kathryn Zickuhr, Applying a racial equity lens to fines and fees in the District of Columbia, D.C. 
POLICY CENTER (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publications/racial-equity-fines-
fees/#_ftnref22. 
64 Darrell Fisher et al., 2016 Traffic Stops in Nebraska: A Report to the Governor and the Legislature on 




65 ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS, https://illinoistrafficstops.com (last visited Dec. 20, 2019). 
66 Mark Denbeaux, Kelley Kearns & Michael Ricciardelli, Racial Profiling Report: Bloomfield Police and 




analysis found that Latinx individuals are significantly more likely (and Latino 
men even more likely) to receive tickets than white or Black individuals.67 
• An Oregon analysis of twelve police departments found disparate outcomes (i.e., 
citation, search, and/or arrest) for Latinx individuals.68 
• A 2014–2015 report issued by the Tucson Police Department found a noticeable 
disparity in the issuance of traffic citations for Black drivers: while Black drivers 
only represented 4.9 percent of the city’s residents, they received 6.5 percent of 
all traffic citations. To a similar extent, other minority drivers, including Latinx 
drivers “received traffic tickets at a rate slightly less than the percentage of each 
ethnicity’s population in Tucson.”69 
 
Data from other jurisdictions further underscoring that people of color across the 
country receive disproportionately harsh outcomes following traffic stops are appended 
to this paper as an appendix. 
 
c. Disproportionate Concentrations of Poverty Among Communities of Color 
People of color make up a disproportionate share of the two thirds of all driver’s license 
suspended for Traffic Debt in New York. 70 As there is a strong correlation between 
poverty and Traffic Debt suspension rates, this is likely in part attributable to the 
disproportionately high concentrations of poverty within communities of color.71 
 
Black individuals are three times as likely, and Latinx individuals are twice as likely, to 
experience poverty than white individuals.72 In 2016, twenty-two percent of Black people 
lived in poverty though Black people represented only about 13.4 percent of the U.S. 
population; by contrast, approximately nine percent of white people lived in poverty, but 
 
67 THE ECONOMIST, Measuring racial bias in police forces (June 22, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/06/22/measuring-racial-bias-in-police-forces. 
68 OREGON CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY OF POLICING REPORT PER HOUSE 
BILL 2355 (2017) (Nov. 25, 2019), 
https://www.oregon.gov/cjc/CJC%20Document%20Library/STOP_Report_Final.pdf. 
69 Amanda Le Claire, Police Ticket Disproportionate Number of Blacks in Tucson, ARIZONA PUBLIC 
MEDIA (July 30, 2015, 5:07 PM), https://www.azpm.org/s/32764-tpd-releases-report-on-traffic-citations-
and-race/. 
70 This is consistent with the data presented in this paper above, as well as with data from other 
jurisdictions. 
[R]ecent data from California show a strong positive correlation by zip code between black 
populations and driver’s license suspension for nonpayment or nonappearance at related court 
hearings. In Virginia, too, data suggest black people disproportionately suffer driver’s license 
suspension for nonpayment. This group also appears to suffer a disproportionate rate of 
convictions for driving with a suspended license when the underlying suspension is due to 
nonpayment. Similar disparities have been documented in Wisconsin. 
Mario Salas & Angela Ciolfi, Driven by Dollars: A State-By-State Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension 
Laws for Failure to Pay Court Debt, LEGAL AID JUSTICE CENTER 4–5 (Fall 2017), 
https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf. 
71 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4. 
72 SHRIVER CENTER ON POVERTY LAW, https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Let-s-talk-about-poverty-




represented about 76.5 percent of the U.S. population.73 Further, “Black and Latinx 
families [are] less likely than white families to have significant wealth and other assets 
that can provide a cushion in lean times, [and] are also disproportionately more likely to 
be experiencing debt, another consequence of poverty with long-term and far-reaching 
effects.”74 Such debt exacerbates financial instability and personal stress and curtails 
future employment and housing opportunities through long-term effects on credit scores 
and background checks.75 
 
This unfortunate reality suggests that people of color are disproportionately at risk for 
driver’s license suspensions issued for Traffic Debt.76 It likewise indicates that they are 
disproportionately less likely to be able to take off work, find childcare, and/or retain 
representation to ensure their appearance in court.77 Moreover, if one is unable to pay a 
traffic fine, there is little incentive for them to appear in court, particularly given that 
they risk “sitting out” their fine in jail for their inevitable inability to pay the fine; this 
accelerates the risk of driver’s license suspension, which of course entails significant 
additional and unaffordable financial obligations. Indeed, throughout New York, the 
driver’s license suspension rate in the ten poorest zip codes is nearly nine times higher 
than the suspension rate in the ten wealthiest zip codes.78 
IV. Consequences of Driver’s License Suspensions 
 
Laws that permit Traffic Debt suspensions without requiring consideration of 
individuals’ ability to pay have far-reaching ramifications. Not only do such laws 
negatively impact the individuals whose licenses are suspended and their families, they 
also harm our communities, public safety, and economy. Traffic Debt suspensions 
seriously impede individuals’ ability to maintain their livelihoods, needlessly expose 
individuals to the criminal justice system, perilously divert law enforcement efforts from 
true public safety threats, and senselessly hamper the economy at large. Furthermore, 
Traffic Debt suspensions are entirely counterproductive in that they make it more 
difficult to collect debt from people who are too impoverished to be able to pay it. In 
short, the consequences of driver’s license suspensions are deleterious for all. 
 
 
73 Elizabeth Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The Disparate Treatment of Black Americans in the 
Criminal Justice System, VERA INSTITUTE 10 (May 2018), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/for-the-record-unjust-burden-racial-disparities.pdf; U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, QuickFacts, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI225218 (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2019). 
74 Zickuhr, supra note 63. 
75 Id. 
76 Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 70 at 3 (“People in this group have fewer available resources to divert to 
paying court debt, and are therefore at greater risk of losing their licenses for nonpayment. While wealthier 
drivers have little difficulty covering court debt, people living paycheck-to-paycheck with little or no 
savings and families to support may not be able to pay in a lump sum or consistently make payments on 
installment plans.”). 
77 Id. at 3–4. 




a. Entrenches the Debt Trap 
For New Yorkers living below the poverty line, driver’s license suspension is all but 
inevitable when faced with traffic fines, fees, and related costs. A full-time minimum 
wage worker, in most areas of New York, grosses $472 per week, amounting to $24,544 
per year; this indicates an average full-time minimum wage worker in most areas of New 
York nets approximately $338 per week, amounting to about $17,576 per year.79 In 2017, 
14.1 percent of New Yorkers—over 2.72 million people—had incomes below the 
poverty line ($24,860 or less for a family of four).80 But it is not only people below the 
poverty line who struggle to pay traffic-related fines and fees. Given that forty percent of 
Americans cannot cover an unexpected $400 expense, a substantial share of the 
population likely cannot cover an unexpected traffic ticket and the related expenses.81 
 
The fines that trigger Traffic Debt suspensions in New York can range from $45 to well 
over $1,000, not including the fees and mandatory surcharge that attach.82 And, because 
multiple tickets and multiple suspensions can result from one single traffic stop—and 
disproportionately do for people of color—many drivers suspended for FTP/FTA face 
thousands of dollars of debt that they cannot afford to pay.83 In addition to fines, New 
York law prescribes a mandatory surcharge that must be assessed for traffic convictions; 
 
79 New York Minimum Wage for 2018, 2019, https://www.minimum-wage.org/new-york (last visited 
Dec. 26, 2019). This is based on New York’s state minimum wage. In Long Island and Westchester, 
minimum wage is $13 per hour. In New York City, minimum wage is $15 per hour. The net estimates were 
calculated using the federal income tax rate, twenty-two percent, and the New York State income tax rate 
for the relevant bracket, 6.33 percent.  
80 CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, NEW YORK 2018 REPORT, https://talkpoverty.org/state-year-
report/new-york-2018-report. 
81 FEDERAL RESERVE, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2017 2 (May 
2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2017-report-economic-well-being-us-
households-201805.pdf. 
82 See, e.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1800; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1809; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1225-
c; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1174. 
83 See, e.g., Alcorn, supra note 5 (“Russell Pleasant, a lifelong resident of Staten Island, is facing a $3,295 
judgment stemming from unpaid tickets issued on three occasions in the mid-1990s that snowballed into 
[seventeen] license suspensions. Arrested in February, he was ordered to pay the debt completely or accept 
a misdemeanor conviction. At age 57, it would be his first. To earn that amount, Mr. Pleasant would need 
to work five weeks at the Ikea warehouse where he is now a forklift operator, a job he said he retrained for 
this winter after the house his family was living in burned down.”); Complaint, supra note 24 ¶ 7 (“[O]ne 
class member was issued four separate tickets for having four tinted windows, costing him $720 ($180 per 
window). Furthermore, in an effort to secure additional payment, the issuing officer offered that class 
member a choice: jail or the immediate impoundment of his car. The class member chose impoundment, 
and thus had to pay an additional $125 fee the next day to retrieve his vehicle, which he needed for his 
livelihood.”); Complaint, supra note 24 ¶¶ 214–22 (“Defendant Thomas . . .  issued Ms. Doe four tickets: 
three seat belt violations and a violation for driving on a learner’s permit. . . . Ms. Doe contested the tickets 
and eventually had a hearing before . . .  the BTVA [which] sent Ms. Doe a letter finding her guilty of all 
four violations and assessing eight points on her driver’s license and $446 in fines. As a result of this 
incident, Ms. Doe also owed a Driver Responsibility Assessment in the amount of $450. At the time of 
hearing, Ms. Doe was attending school full-time and had no income. Ms. Doe could not afford to pay her 
tickets and surcharges in one lump sum. Ms. Doe sought a payment plan from the BTVA. The BTVA 
refused to provide a payment plan or accept partial payments. Because she could not have a payment plan, 
Ms. Doe could not pay at all. The NYS Department of Motor Vehicles suspended Ms. Doe’ learner’s 




for certain traffic convictions, the surcharge is as high as $88–$93.84 Further, driver 
responsibility assessments are imposed on drivers who accumulate more than six points 
on their license within eighteen months; the assessment is $300 over three years for six 
points, and an additional $75 for every point in excess of six points, payable over three 
years.85 Additionally, in some jurisdictions such as Buffalo and Long Island, there are 
about $100 in additional fees per traffic ticket.86 
 
Drivers suspended for Traffic Debt in New York must pay a $70 STF along with the 
underlying fines and fees in a lump sum, to get their license reinstated; if a driver has 
multiple suspensions, they must pay the $70 STF for each suspension prior to 
reinstatement.87 If an individual has multiple FTP/FTA suspensions, fees of up to $400 
may also be imposed.88 
 
It is all but obvious that fines, fees, and other costs quickly cascade and become 
prohibitively expensive for people who could not afford what very likely began as a 
simple traffic ticket. For many New Yorkers, coming up with these sums to pay the 
traffic-related fines, fees, and costs before the payment deadline is an impossible feat. 
People are forced to choose between paying the traffic-related fines, fees, and costs and 
purchasing basic necessities for themselves and their families, which really is no choice at 
all. Thus, Traffic Debt suspensions become inescapable and further entrench people in 
an already insurmountable debt trap. 
 
The loss of the ability to drive seriously threatens individuals’ economic security. 
Without the ability to legally drive, individuals are impeded from meeting basic needs of 
their families—they are precluded from legally driving to jobs, schools, medical 
appointments, places of worship, grocery stores, etc.89 The irony of New York’s license-
for-payment scheme is that those who lose their licenses for their inability to pay traffic-
related debt are thrust deeper into poverty due to the financial consequences flowing 
from the suspensions of their driver’s licenses. It therefore perpetuates the already 
intractable cycle of poverty that too many New Yorkers endure. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized the financial consequences that inevitably 
flow from government attempts to extract wealth from individuals charged with 
violations such as those that underlie suspensions for FTP/FTA: 
 
 
84 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1809; Increases In The Cost Of Traffic Tickets In New York, ROSENBLUM 
LAW (May 6, 2013), https://newyorkspeedingfines.com/increases-cost-traffic-tickets-york/. The law does 
cap the surcharge that can be assessed per incident at $196. NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE 
COMPTROLLER, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRAFFIC TICKET SURCHARGES 5 (Aug. 2015), 
https://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093015/14s26.pdf 
85 N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, How to pay a driver responsibility assessment, 
https://dmv.ny.gov/tickets/how-pay-driver-responsibility-assessment (last visited Dec. 26, 2019). 
86 McLeod, supra note 42; Schneider, supra note 37. 
87 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 503(j-1)(i); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, A Guide to Suspension 
& Revocation of Driving Privileges in New York State, https://dmv.ny.gov/brochure/c-12.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2019). 
88 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 503(j-1)(i). 
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Raising money for government through law enforcement whatever the source 
. . . can lay a debt trap for the poor. When a minor offense produces a debt, that 
debt, along with the attendant court appearances, can lead to loss of employment 
or shelter, compounding interest, yet more legal action, and an ever-expanding 
financial burden—a cycle as predictable and counterproductive as it is 
intractable.90 
 
Indeed, the California Legislature, “[i]n recognition of the counterproductive nature of 
[the license-for-payment scheme] and its tendency to enmesh indigent defendants in a 
cycle of repeated violations and escalating debt. . . amended several statutes to prohibit 
the courts and the [DMV] from suspending a driver’s license because of an unpaid traffic 
citation”91 
 
Once a driver’s license is issued, it “become[s] essential [to] the pursuit of a livelihood,” 
thereby rendering the suspension of driver’s licenses incredibly harmful to individuals 
and their families.92 It is therefore unsurprising that there is a strong correlation between 
driver’s license suspension and job loss as well as missed job opportunities.93 For 
instance, a New Jersey study indicated that forty-two percent of people lost their jobs 
after their driver’s licenses were suspended; nearly half of those people could not find 
new jobs.94 Of those able to find new employment, eighty-eight percent reported a 
decrease in pay.95 Similarly, a study conducted in Phoenix, Arizona demonstrated that 
28.3 percent of individuals lost a job immediately after their driver’s license was 
suspended; 52.9 percent of those whose license was suspended for more than three 
months reported losing a job as a direct consequence of their suspended license. The 
median annual income loss as a result of license suspensions was $36,800.96 
 
Driver’s license suspensions thus trap people who are poor in an impossible 
predicament. They often cannot work without their driver’s license because they lose 
their method of commuting or because their job requires a valid driver’s license; 
however, they also cannot afford to pay what is required to have their license reinstated 
without steady employment. The bottom line is that for many New Yorkers, the 
 
90 Rivera v. Orange Cty. Prob. Dep't, 832 F.3d 1103, 1112 n.7 (9th Cir. 2016).  
91 People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1164, n.1 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied (Mar. 27, 2019). 
92 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). 
93 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 89 at 36; Salas & Ciolfi, supra note 70 at 3; Emily Reina 
Dindial & Ronald J. Lampard, Opinion, When a Traffic Ticket Costs $13,000, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/opinion/drivers-license-suspension-fees.html. 
94 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 89 at 36; Henry Grabar, Too Broke to Drive: States have 
trapped millions of Americans in crippling debt by taking away their driver’s licenses. Can the damage be 
undone?, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2017), https://slate.com/business/2017/09/state-lawmakers-have-trapped-
millions-of-americans-in-debt-by-taking-their-licenses.html; Joshua Aiken, Reinstating Common Sense: 
How Driver’s License Suspensions for Drug Offenses Unrelated to Driving Are Falling out of Favor, 
PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/driving/national.html. 
95 Aiken, supra note 94. 
96 L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY, THE CITY OF PHOENIX 
MUNICIPAL COURT’S COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 2016: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT (June 2, 





suspension of their driver’s license necessarily results in the deprivation of their 
livelihoods because, in many instances, it robs them of their right to work for a living.97 
 
As a practical matter, most individuals rely on driver’s licenses to travel to work and 
maintain employment.98 “[A] license is often needed for commuting, particularly as jobs 
are increasingly located outside of inner-city areas.”99  Although public transportation 
may be a commuting solution for some, for those working or living outside of major 
metropolitan areas, public transportation is generally not a viable option. Outside of 
New York City, in places such as Rochester, Syracuse, and Long Island where public 
transportation is scarcer, people are critically dependent upon their ability to drive to 
maintain their jobs. Even if commuting via public transit is a theoretical option for those 
living in metropolitan areas, there are often numerous obstacles, such as the substantial 
additional time it takes to get to work using public transit100 as well as the “long 
headways, limited service hours, costs, difficulty using transit to make multiple stops on 
the way to or from work[,] and safety issues after dark,”101 that those commuting by 
public transit face. 
 
Further, a driver’s license “is a very common requirement for the sorts of job that can 
actually lift people out of poverty—those in construction, manufacturing, security, and 
union jobs including electricians and plumbers [as well as jobs in home health care, 
motor vehicle sales and services, and delivery services].”102 In addition, “[m]any jobs 
require driving as part of the work responsibilities; and even for non-driving jobs, 
employers often require applicants to have a valid driver’s license as an indicator of 
reliability or responsibility.”103 The result is that for people with a suspended driver’s 
license, the pool of job opportunities is limited. These limited job prospects, in turn, 
make the debt trap, and poverty, even more difficult to escape. 
 
 
97 Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (pursuit of an occupation or profession is a liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (“the right to 
hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental 
interference comes within the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ concepts of [Due Process]); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 
33, 41 (1915) (“the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment 
to secure”). 
98 Danielle Conley & Ariel Levinson-Waldman, Discriminatory Driver’s License Suspension Schemes, ACS 
LAW (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/issue_brief/briefs-landing/discriminatory-drivers-license-
suspension-schemes/#_ednref42. 
99 Alex Bender, et al., Not Just a Ferguson Problem: How Traffic Courts Drive Inequality in California, 
LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA 17 (2015), 
http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-
Inequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf. 
100 Mike Maciag, Riding Transit Takes Almost Twice as Long as Driving, GOVERNING (Feb. 2017), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-transit-driving-times.html. 
101 Evelyn Blumenberg & Daniel Baldwin Hess, Measuring the Role of Transportation in Facilitating the 
Welfareto-Work Transition: Evidence from Three California Counties, J. OF THE TRANSP. RESEARCH BD 
1859 (2003), https:// escholarship.org/uc/item/2ww4c93w. 
102 Alana Semuels, No Driver’s License, No Job, ATLANTIC (June 15, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/no-drivers-license-no-job/486653/; Bender, 
supra note 99 at 17–18. 




In sum, driver’s license suspensions further entrench the debt trap by impeding 
employment opportunities. They foreclose people from employment because a license is 
often needed for transportation to and from work and is increasingly required for certain 
jobs, even jobs for jobs for which driving is not a job function. As people of color 
disproportionately suffer from driver’s license suspensions, they correspondingly and 
disproportionately face an additional barrier to the job market—the lack of a driver’s 
license. As a result of this employment barrier, the individual now has a decreased ability 
to pay what is required to get their license reinstated, which serves only to further 
compound the debt trap. 
 
b. Bloats the Criminal Justice System 
Of equal concern, Traffic Debt suspensions needlessly expand the scope of the criminal 
justice system, inducting staggering numbers of New Yorkers into the criminal justice 
system on the basis of race and poverty, and fueling mass incarceration. 
 
Since the ability to drive is crucial to daily life and the livelihoods of individuals, about 
seventy-five percent of people with suspended licenses continue to drive.104 If they are 
caught, they are arrested—establishing a means by which individuals are thrust into the 
criminal justice system because of their inability to pay. In addition to making important 
life responsibilities much tougher (and even impossible) to go about, Traffic Debt 
suspensions paradoxically make it increasingly difficult for individuals to meet 
subsequent court obligations.105 This can result in added FTA charges for individuals 
who, in part as a result of their suspension, lack the resources and/or transportation to 
make court appearances. Thus, many individuals continue to drive, even though they run 
the risk of being stopped, ticketed, arrested, and charged for driving with a suspended 
license because their survival depends on it. 
 
More than seven million Americans have had their driver’s license suspended for Traffic 
Debt.106 Between 2016 and 2018, New York issued nearly 1.7 million driver’s license 
suspensions for Traffic Debt.107 As so many suspended drivers have no choice but to 
continue driving to meet their families’ basic needs, it follows that driving with a 
suspended license is one of the most common criminal charges in New York and around 
the country: 
 
• According to DMV data, New York issued more than 108,000 tickets for driving 
with a suspended license in 2018. Suffolk County issued the most tickets for 
driving with a suspended license in 2018, handing out nearly 21,000 tickets. 
Nassau County issued the next most tickets, totaling almost 8,500, with Erie 
 
104 OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK CITY CONTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, FEES, FINES AND FAIRNESS: 
HOW MONETARY CHARGES DRIVE INEQUITY IN NEW YORK CITY’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 36 (Sept. 
2019); AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, Best Practices Guide to Reducing Suspended Drivers 4 
(Feb. 2013), https:// www.aamva.org/Suspended-and-Revoked-Drivers-Working-Group/. 
105 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., supra note 32 at 50. 
106 Justin Wm. Moyer, More than 7 Million People May Have Lost Driver’s Licenses Because of Traffic 
Debt, WASH. POST (May 19, 2018) (“The total number nationwide could be much higher based on the 
population of states that did not or could not provide data.”). 




County and Onondaga County following next, issuing 7,310 tickets and 6,320 
tickets, respectively.108 
• Between 2014 and 2017 in Erie County, police charged a staggering 33,000 
individuals with driving with a suspended license—in Buffalo alone, more than 
14,000 individuals were charged with driving with a suspended license. Between 
January 2014 and October 2018, “more than 900 drivers charged with these 
offenses were shipped to the Erie County Holding Center . . . presumably after 
being unable to post bail.” Of these 900 individuals, nearly seventy-five percent 
were Black, though Black individuals make up just thirty-seven percent of 
Buffalo’s population.109 
• In New York City, where substantially fewer people drive than in most places, 
the fourth most charged crime in 2018 was driving with a suspended license. 
Eighty percent of those arrested for driving with a suspended license in New 
York City are Black or Latinx.110 
• In Michigan, the third most frequent charge leading to jail admission is driving 
without a valid license.111 And, between 2008 and 2018, seventeen percent of 
those jailed for driving without a valid license in Michigan were jailed for at least 
one week. 112 
• In Illinois, police made over 43,400 arrests in 2016 for driving with a suspended 
license—half the arrests were of Black drivers.113 
• In Florida, law enforcement issued over 232,000 citations for driving with a 
suspended or revoked license in 2017—more than five times as many citations as 
were issued for driving under the influence. Convictions resulted from 53,000 of 
these citations, amounting to over 600 new offenses each day across the state, 
and 98 per day in Miami-Dade County alone.114 
• Between 2013 and 2015, the Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department arrested and 
charged 19,108 people for driving with a license that had been suspended for a 
reason other than driving safety. People of color made up an overwhelming 
 
108 DMV data obtained by Rosenblum Law and on file with authors. For additional historical data and 
analysis, see Adam Rosenblum, Driving with a Suspended Driver’s License in New York, ROSENBLUM 
LAW, https://traffictickets.com/new-york/criminal-charges/driving-with-a-suspended-license (last 
updated Aug. 9, 2019). 
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proportion of these arrests—Black people were overrepresented at a rate of 3.6x; 
Latinx people were overrepresented at a rate of 1.1x. White people were 
underrepresented at a rate of 0.6x for these arrests. (During this timeframe, the 
Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department also effectuated 4,391 arrests pursuant to a 
warrant issued for FTP/FTA. People of color were also disproportionately 
overrepresented for these arrests)115 
• Between 2013 and 2015, the San Francisco Sherriff’s Department effectuated 
9,312 arrests for driving with a license that had been suspended for a reason 
other than driving safety. Black people made up an overwhelming proportion of 
these arrests—they were overrepresented at a rate of 7.8x. (During this 
timeframe, the San Francisco Sherriff’s Department also effectuated 855 arrests 
pursuant to a warrant issued for FTP/FTA. People of color were also 
disproportionately overrepresented for these arrests)116 
• Between January 2013 and March 2016 in San Joaquin County, California, 1,717 
arrests were made for FTP/FTA and driving with a suspended license. Most 
arrests had multiple booking charges, but forty percent—or 693—of these 
arrests had no booking charges that were deemed serious offenses, i.e. acts that 
reasonably endangered public safety. While the average jail time for these arrests 
was 1.1 days, fifty-eight individuals spent more than three days in jail and 
seventeen individuals spent more than ten days in jail for such arrests. 223 
individuals, accounting for thirteen percent of the total arrests, were booked 
solely on the charge of driving with a suspended license. These individuals spent 
an average of 0.85 days—approximately 20 hours—in jail; however, three people 
spent between ten and thirteen days in jail, and one individual spent twenty-one 
days in jail, all for the singular offense of driving with a suspended license, where 
the license was suspended for a reason that did not pose a threat to public 
safety.117 
 
If an individual is caught driving with a suspended license, which people of color 
disproportionately are, they are charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor 
vehicle (AUO), which entails an onslaught of even more additional fines, fees, 
surcharges, and costs as well as possible imprisonment.118 
 
115 BACK ON THE ROAD CALIFORNIA, Stopped, Fined, Arrested – Racial Bias in Policing and Traffic 
Courts in California 13 (Apr. 2016), https://ebclc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Stopped_Fined_Arrested_BOTRCA.pdf. Please note, there appears to be a 
typo in this source. The data following the text on page 13 demonstrates rates of over and under-
representation for arrests made for driving with a suspended license in Los Angeles County, but the text 
preceding the data mistakenly refers to “San Francisco County” in the second paragraph. 
116 Id. at 16–18. 
117 Id. at 20. 
118 When people are arrested for driving with a suspended license, they are often handcuffed for hours, 
and once detained may wait as long as forty-eight hours—the constitutional limit—to be seen by a judge. 
BACK ON THE ROAD CALIFORNIA, supra note 115 at 28. However, sometimes, “administrative or 
bureaucratic errors can undermine the timeliness by which an arrestee avails himself of this fundamental 
constitutional right.” Id. These police detentions have negative psychological impacts on individuals that 
can last long beyond the arrest and detention. Further, as arrests are unplanned, they pull people from 
their daily responsibilities and therefore cause people to miss work, lose their jobs, go without needed 





For AUO in the third degree, the charge for a first offense, New York law assesses a fine 
between $200–$500, or imposes up to thirty days’ imprisonment; it also allows for both 
the fine and imprisonment.119 For AUO in the second degree, which a person is charged 
with if they committed an AUO in the preceding eighteen months or have three or more 
FTP/FTA suspensions,120 New York law assesses a fine of at least $500 and also requires 
a term of imprisonment or probation.121 Because AUO in the third and second degree 
are misdemeanors, a mandatory $175 surcharge and $25 crime victim assistance fee are 
also assessed—the court has no discretion to waive the surcharges or fees.122 For AUO 
in the first degree, the charge if a person commits an AUO in the third degree and has 
ten or more FTP/FTA suspensions,123 New York law assesses a fine between $500–
$5,000 and requires a term of imprisonment or probation.124 This is a felony and so a 
$300 mandatory surcharge and $25 crime victim assistance fee are also assessed.125 
 
Not only do AUO charges related to FTP/FTA suspensions needlessly incarcerate 
people for their poverty, they also serve to entrench the debt trap, as discussed above.126 
The fines, fees, and surcharges are then compounded by the higher insurance premiums 
one will have to pay if they are found guilty of driving with a suspended license.127 
 
In short, suspensions for non-driving safety reasons needlessly lead to AUO pleas and 
convictions that generate criminal records that most otherwise would not have. By virtue 
of AUOs producing a criminal record, Traffic Debt suspensions serve to foreclose even 
more employment opportunities, further exacerbating the financial impact of a driver’s 
license suspension. Traffic Debt suspensions essentially create a “gateway to jail, 




released from detainment, they are then compelled “to navigate a confusing and complex court process, 
pay attorney’s fees and court fees, and decide whether to plead guilty to a misdemeanor offense of driving 
with a suspended license, which comes with a litany of additional penalties.” Id. at 29. (Note, in New York, 
AUO in the first degree is a felony offense.) Jail time and hefty fines attach if one pleads guilty to driving 
with a suspended license in New York, even for a first offense. 
119 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(1)(b). 
120 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(2)(a)(i), (iv). 
121 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(2)(b). If a person is charged with AUO in the second degree for 
committing an AUO in the preceding eighteen months, a term of imprisonment must be imposed and it 
must not exceed 180 days. If a person is charged with AUO in the second degree because they have three 
or more FTP/FTA suspensions, the term of imprisonment must be at least seven days, but is also capped 
at 180 days. Id. 
122 N.Y. Penal Law § 60.35(1)(a)(ii); People v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 730, 47 N.E.3d 710 (2016). 
123 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(3)(a)(ii). 
124 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 511(3)(b). 
125 N.Y. Penal Law § 60.35(1)(a)(i). 
126 See supra Section IV.a. 





c. Endangers Public Safety 
When driver’s licenses are suspended for non-safety reasons, such as Traffic Debt 
suspensions, public safety is at risk. Such suspensions reduce the number of insured 
drivers on the road and divert significant public safety resources. 
 
Traffic Debt suspensions unnecessarily increase the number of unlicensed and uninsured 
drivers on the road, thereby jeopardizing public safety. This is the case because many 
suspended drivers must drive despite their license suspension to get to work and medical 
appointments, drop their kids off at school, and make their court dates, and people 
convicted of driving with a suspended license often lose their insurance coverage. 
Further, for reinstated drivers, insurance premiums often become cost prohibitive as 
they are higher for previously suspended drivers, regardless of the underlying reason for 
the suspension (as driving records do not always distinguish between suspensions due to 
unsafe driving behaviors and other reasons).129 
 
Traffic Debt suspensions also divert already limited law enforcement, DMV, and court 
resources from drivers that pose a true threat to public safety.130 The only logical reason 
to suspend an individual’s driver’s license is if that individual poses a threat to public 
safety—i.e., if they are a dangerous driver. In fact, driver’s license suspensions were first 
instituted for the purposes of removing dangerous drivers from the road, changing risky 
driving behaviors, and punishing unsafe drivers.131 Though social nonconformance 
related suspensions132 were later introduced in an effort “to change non-highway safety 
related” behaviors, “no empirical evidence . . . indicates that suspending a person’s 
driving privilege for social nonconformance reasons is effective in gaining compliance 
with the reason for the original non-driving suspension.”133 According to the American 
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, these social nonconformance related 
suspensions are ineffective and counterproductive: they have “dramatically increased the 
number of suspended drivers on our roads” and created “a tremendous burden on law 
enforcement, [DMVs], the courts, and local communities.”134 
 
Traffic Debt suspensions are not for dangerous driving; they are for nonpayments and 
nonappearances. Given that drivers suspended for non-safety reasons represent the vast 
majority of all suspended drivers in New York135 and that “most drivers with suspended 
licenses pose no more of a threat to public safety than validly licensed drivers,”136 this 
misallocation of resources is the true public safety threat with which we should be 
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concerned.137 This is particularly so in New York because we know two thirds of all 
driver’s license suspensions are issued for FTP/FTA—reasons wholly unrelated to 
driver dangerousness.138 
 
Indeed, when an already overburdened police force must use finite resources and 
expend significant staff hours to pull over, transport, often jail, and attend court 
dates with safe drivers who have been driving with a suspended license, it 
decreases public safety. Judges, defense lawyers[,] and prosecutors are placed in a 
similar situation. The time they spend dealing with otherwise safe drivers 
inevitably eats into time that could be spent monitoring the roads for reckless 
drivers and punishing those who could do the public serious harm.139 
 
Law enforcement agencies expend millions of dollars and personnel hours each year to 
administer suspensions issued for reasons unrelated to driving.140 For example: 
• In Union County, Ohio it takes an average of nine hours to arrest and prosecute 
an individual for driving with a suspended license.141 
• It is estimated that Washington County State Patrol troopers expend over 79,041 
personnel hours each year “in the arrest and adjudication of drivers caught 
driving while suspended for non-highway safety related reasons.”142 
 
The financial and personnel costs to DMVs are also substantial and cause them to 
“operate outside their core mission of ensuring highway safety.”143 For instance: 
• The Colorado DMV estimated it would expend 8,566 manual employee hours—
equating to 4.22 full time employees—to process social nonconformance related 
suspensions, and 10,080 hearing officer hours—equating to 4.84 full time hearing 
officers—to hold hearings and issue findings in social nonconformance related 
suspension cases.144 
 
Courts are likewise already overburdened with more cases for the number of judges 
available; the addition of cases for driving while suspended as a result of a non-safety 
violation simply compounds that burden.145 Similarly, non-safety suspension cases take 
up a substantial amount of public defenders’ time. For instance, in 2017, low-level 
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suspension cases made up about fifteen percent of the Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo’s 
total caseload.146 
 
These costs incurred by law enforcement, DMVs, judges, and lawyers are without any 
benefits. Drivers whose license are suspended for unpaid debt are not unsafe drivers, 
and non-driving safety related suspensions have proven to be ineffective in achieving 
their purposes.147 In brief, “[t]he costs of arresting, processing, administering, and 
enforcing social nonconformance related driver license suspensions create a significant 
strain on budgets and other resources and detract from highway and public safety 
priorities.”148 Traffic Debt suspensions therefore imprudently divert law enforcement to 
handle issues involving poverty, rather than focusing on true safety issues such as 
dangerous driving and serious crime. 
 
d. Harms the Economy 
Not only do driver’s license suspensions threaten individual financial stability, they also 
have ramifications for the economy at large. Job losses flowing from driver’s license 
suspensions have a profoundly negative impact on both GDP and tax revenue. And as 
driver’s license suspensions are an ineffective collections tactic, they likely do nothing to 
offset these negative impacts. Furthermore, driver’s license suspensions harm employers, 
which in turn also contributes to decreased GDP and tax revenue. 
 
A study of a driver’s license reinstatement program in Phoenix, Arizona found that the 
median annual income loss as a result of driver’s license suspensions was $36,800. This 
resulted in decreased GDP and tax revenue as there are positive correlations between 
low unemployment and GDP and tax revenue. To this end, the study further found that 
after the driver’s licenses of the 7,000 program participants were reinstated, they 
collectively gained 1,904 job years of employment149 and $87 million in labor income, 
which, due to individuals’ reinstated ability to earn and spend money, resulted in a $149.6 
million increase in GDP. Likewise, the $87 million in labor income positively impacted 
state income tax revenue given the positive correlation between low unemployment rates 
and tax revenue.150 
 
Moreover, driver’s license suspensions are an ineffective collections tactic and therefore 
do nothing to benefit the government’s fiscal coffers or offset the economic harm of 
Traffic Debt suspensions. Because people who do not have the money to pay simply 
cannot pay it, nearly half of suspensions issued in 2016 in New York remained in effect 
one year later.151 By way of further example, Tulsa County state courts have levied $209.3 
million in fines and court costs on individuals for traffic, misdemeanor, and felony cases 
since 2008. Yet, as of mid-2019, $157.8 million—about three quarters of the original 
amount levied—is still owed. It is hardly a coincidence that residents living in the zip 
 
146 McLeod, supra note 109.. 
147 See infra Section IV.d. 
148 AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, supra note 104 at 2. 
149 One job year is defined as the employment of one person for twelve consecutive months. L. WILLIAM 
SEIDMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 96 at 5 n.3.  
150 L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 96. 




codes that owe the most in court fines and fees are comprised of some of the poorest 
residents in the county and are largely communities of color.152 
 
Employers too are harmed when driver’s licenses are suspended because they are forced 
to “hire and train new workers every time an employee is fired because he or she is 
unable to drive to work.”153 Hiring and re-training a new person for a job that was being 
performed well by someone else entails a cost in and of itself.154 Losing a qualified, 
productive employee results in a financial loss to the employer as the resources and 
training the employer invested in the employee become a sunk cost if the employee is no 
longer able to perform job duties due to their driver’s license suspension. Moreover, 
non-safety suspensions unnecessarily diminish the available labor force, making certain 
jobs unnecessarily difficult for employers to fill. For example, a driver’s license is often a 
prerequisite for employment in industries such as construction, home health care, motor 
vehicle sales and services, and delivery services.155 As a consequence of Traffic Debt 
suspensions, these industries suffer in terms of productivity for they cannot fill open 
positions due to the needlessly narrowed labor pool, as do the governments that benefit 
from taxable revenue and the constituents these industries serve. 
 
In sum, Traffic Debt suspensions strike a hard and wide-reaching economic blow to the 
economy, governments, and employers alike. 
V. Grave Lack of Traffic-Stop Data in New York is Problematic 
 
The lack of available traffic-stop data is problematic and, in many ways, hinders effective 
policing.156 Currently, New York law does not require law enforcement agencies to 
collect and maintain data with respect to traffic stops and persons patted down, frisked, 
and searched.157 Although a Senate bill from the 2017-2018 Legislative Session, 
highlighting New York legislators’ concern for racially discriminatory policing practices, 
would have required the collection and publication of data on traffic stops, the bill 




152 Curtis Killman & Tim Stanley, Unpaid court fees disproportionately impact north Tulsa leaving 
residents 'entrapped' in debt, analysis shows, TULSA WORLD (Dec. 4, 2019), 
https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/specialreports-databases/unpaid-court-fees-disproportionately-
impacts-north-tulsa-leaving-residents-entrapped/article_fa02e372-25ef-512e-829f-742f12979e7d.html. 
153 Harmann Singh, Challenging Unconstitutional Driver’s License Suspensions, U. OF PENN. CAREY L. 
SCH. (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/7910-challenging-unconstitutional-drivers-
license. 
154 Bender, supra note 99 at 18. 
155 Id. at 17–18. 
156 See, e.g., POLICING PROJECT, N.Y.U, It’s Time to Start Collecting Stop Data: A Case for 
Comprehensive Statewide Legislation (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.policingproject.org/news-
main/2019/9/27/its-time-to-start-collecting-stop-data-a-case-for-comprehensive-statewide-legislation. 
157 The New York State Police did, however, comply with the Stanford Open Policing Project’s request for 
traffic-stop data. It reported 7,962,169 stops from December 2009 through December 2017, and included 




Blacks [sic], Hispanics and other minority groups have long been victims of 
biased and unjustified vehicle stops, searches and frisks by law enforcement 
officers. The arguably unconstitutional use of race or ethnicity as a criterion [sic] 
has become the focus of many civil and human rights groups. The practice is 
commonly known as "racial profiling." The use of racial profiling has 
consequently had a corrosive effect on the relations between police and tile 
minority communities. This practice deprives minorities of their Fourth 
Amendment right to be [sic] free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
their right to be free from discriminations based on race guaranteed under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the [U.S.] Constitution. 158 
 
As at least some New York legislators have evidently recognized, data regarding racial 
profiling in traffic stops are limited.159 As of September 2019, nineteen states required 
the collection of data on every law enforcement initiated traffic stop.160 When traffic-stop 
data are available, society at large benefits from increased transparency and 
accountability, which in turn also promotes better policing. 
 
a.  Lack of Data Thwarts Transparency and Accountability 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1996 decision that held police could use any traffic offense as 
a reason to stop motorists (i.e., pretextual stops) effectively gave law enforcement the 
green light to disproportionately stop people of color.161 The N.Y. Court of Appeals has 
acknowledged that racial disparities exist in law enforcement stop practices and has 
pronounced that “[d]iscriminatory law enforcement has no place in our law.”162 Yet, 
 
158 S. 2146, An act to amend the executive law, in relation to ethnic or racial profiling, 2017–2018 Reg. 
Sess. New York City Council member Donovan Richards has also proposed a bill that would require the 
NYPD to issue a quarterly report on all vehicle stops. Int 1671-2019, A Local Law to amend the 
administrative code of the city of New York, in relation to requiring the police department to report on 
traffic encounters, 2019 Reg. Sess. 
159 Indeed, in a 2014 report the NAACP noted: 
Since the 2004 AIUSA poll on racial profiling and the 2011 DOJ survey of traffic and pedestrian 
stops, no new data on profiling on a nationwide level exists. Many police departments, either 
voluntarily or to meet specific legislative mandates or other legal obligations, collect data on racial 
profiling. However, this data is not always readily available to the public and it is not compiled to 
offer national statistics. Often, these numbers can be accessed on a local level—usually through 
years of advocacy and submissions of Freedom of Information Act requests. The fight to end 
racial profiling in New York City, in fact, was based on the data that advocates were able to 
access on stop-and-frisk numbers spanning over a decade. 
NATIONAL ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, Born Suspect: Stop-and-Frisk Abuses 
& the Continued Fight to End Racial Profiling in America 9 (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/naacp/Born_Suspect_Report_final_web.pdf. 
160 POLICING PROJECT, N.Y.U, supra note 156. 
161 Whren v. United States, 571 U.S. 896 (1996); Kevin R. Johnson, Doubling Down on Racial 
Discrimination: The Racially Disparate Impacts of Crime-Based Removals, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 993, 
1005–06 (2016) (“[T]he decision in effect authorizes racial profiling in run-of-the-mill traffic stops, a 
common modern law-enforcement technique. By many accounts, racial profiling currently is routine 
among state and local police in jurisdictions across the United States. It has become an integral tool 
employed in the much-maligned, yet nevertheless aggressively enforced, ‘war on drugs.’”)  
162 People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 352 (2001). 
We are not unmindful of studies, some of which are cited by defendants and the amici, which 




racial data on traffic stops are seldom collected and these practices continue to persist, at 
least in part, due to the lack of transparency and accountability. 
 
Transparency—and the collection and analysis of data—is key to understanding how 
policing works in all of our communities. It promotes accountability, and in turn fosters 
policing that serves all members of our communities effectively—i.e., good law 
enforcement. The DOJ has recognized this in its evaluations of the Suffolk County 
Police Department (SCPD). In an assessment of the SCPD’s compliance with the 
parties’ settlement agreement, it noted that the “collection of meaningful and accurate 
traffic stop data” is critical to “ensuring that policing services are delivered in a manner 
free from bias.”163 The DOJ has further explained: 
 
By collecting the necessary data, and periodically analyzing that data, the [DOJ] 
will be able to ensure that [the SCPD] is conducting traffic stops in a race-neutral 
and non-discriminatory manner. A robust bias-free training for all officers and 
recruits is also necessary to train them to better identify implicit biases and to 
incorporate the principles of procedural justice in interactions with the diverse 
communities they serve. . . . [T]hese requirements are fundamental to the 
continued delivery of bias-free policing. . . .164 
 
Similarly, data that a court compelled the New York Police Department (NYPD) to turn 
over as a result of the settlement agreement in Daniels et al. v. City of New York 
revealed significant racial disparities in pedestrian-stop context—eighty-five person of 
those subjected to stops by the NYPD were Black or Latinx, while only ten percent were 
white—and resulted in the Floyd litigation.165 In Floyd, the court ultimately found that 
 
that those stops do not end in the discovery of a higher proportion of contraband than in the 
cars of other groups. The fact that such disparities exist is cause for both vigilance and concern 
about the protections given by the New York State Constitution. Discriminatory law 
enforcement has no place in our law. 
Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted). 
163 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THIRD REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE 
BY SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEPARTMENT 7 (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download. 
164 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SIXTH REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE BY 
SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEP’T 6 (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download. 
Without doubt, bias-free policing is more effective policing. Removing bias from policing benefits both 
the citizenry and law enforcement. Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for 
"Community Engagement" Provisions in Doj Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 802 (2016) 
(“when police processes are perceived as procedurally just, communities are more likely to cooperate with 
the police, and policing, in turn, is more effective”). Not only is bias-free policing a much better use of 
limited public resources because it ensures law enforcement focuses its efforts on true public safety 
threats, it also fosters trust and relationships between the police and the communities they serve. 
Christopher N. Lasch et. al., Understanding "Sanctuary Cities, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1761 (2018) 
(“Community trust is critical for effective policing programs.”). It protects citizens against unconstitutional 
government encroachments while allowing for more effective crime prevention. Thus, the availability of 
data also stimulates better law enforcement practices, which in turn bolstering the public’s faith in our law 
enforcement institutions. 
165 CATALYSTS FOR COLLABORATION, Case Study: Floyd v. City of New York, 




the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices were violative of the Equal Protection Clause.166 
The plaintiffs were able to prove that the City, through the NYPD, had a policy of racial 
profiling by relying on data that demonstrated that: “the NYPD carries out more stops 
where there are more [B]lack and Hispanic residents, even when other relevant variables 
are held constant,” “NYPD officers are more likely to stop [B]lacks and Hispanics than 
whites within precincts and census tracts, even after controlling for other relevant 
variables” and “are more likely to use force against blacks and Hispanics than whites, 
after controlling for other relevant variables, and that “NYPD officers stop [B]lacks and 
Hispanics with less justification than whites.”167 But for the data that compelled these 
factual findings, it is hard to say whether the court would have reached the conclusion it 
ultimately came to,168 and ordered the reforms that it did.169 
 
In short, the role of data in Floyd cannot be understated. The patent racial disparities the 
Floyd litigation uncovered in the pedestrian-stop context evince the need for analogous 
data in the traffic-stop context, not only for the sake of transparency and accountability, 
but also to ensure effective policing. It is incumbent upon New York policymakers to 
utilize the lessons learned from Ferguson and Floyd—and across the nation—and 
require the collection and analysis of data with respect to all police stops. It should not 
take lawsuits and settlement agreements for law enforcement to be transparent and held 
to account. Relevant data should be made publicly available and law enforcement should 
be analyzing and engaging with such data in a manner that fosters better and more just 
law enforcement practices.170 
 
166 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
167 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 661 (emphasis in original). 
168 
The Equal Protection Clause does not sanction treating similarly situated members of different 
racial groups differently based on racial disparities in crime data. Indeed, such treatment would 
eviscerate the core guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. If equal protection means 
anything, it means that individuals may not be punished or rewarded based on the government's 
views regarding their racial group, regardless of the source of those views. . . . The Equal 
Protection Clause's prohibition on selective enforcement means that suspicious [B]lacks and 
Hispanics may not be treated differently by the police than equally suspicious whites. Individuals 
of all races engage in suspicious behavior and break the law. Equal protection guarantees that 
similarly situated individuals of these races will be held to account equally. 
Id. at 667. 
169 Floyd resulted in a host of policing reforms. Among other things, the court: (1) ordered the NYPD to 
institute a pilot program that required “officers on patrol in one precinct per borough—specifically the 
precinct with the highest number of stops during 2012” to wear body cameras to record street encounters 
as a potential tool for accountability; (2) appointed an independent monitor to engage in direct oversight 
of the reform process; and (3) initiated a joint remedial process to solicit additional solutions from various 
impacted stakeholders on how the NYPD should further reform its policing practices. Floyd v. City of 
New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 676, 685–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
170 See, e.g., SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, Police and Data Collection: Why Louisiana Needs 
Reform (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/20181115/police-and-data-collection-why-louisiana-
needs-reform. 
Good governance is just as dependent on data. Governments constantly collect, analyze, and 
disseminate data to keep the public informed about everything from economic trends to the 
projected paths of hurricanes, from comparisons of student loan options to the spread of 
infectious diseases. If government policies are not data-driven, it is hard for government to be 
effective. It is no surprise, then, that data are just as important to policing as they are to the rest 





b. Availability of Data Drives Better Policing Practices  
There is also real evidence that proves that when data are made available, better policing 
practices follow: 
 
As a result of the traffic-stop data collection practices mandated by the SCPD’s 
settlement agreement with the DOJ, it’s bias-free policing practices have improved 
considerably, though there is still much more that must be done.171 Similarly, as discussed 
above, after the settlement agreement in Daniels required the NYPD to provide stop-
and-frisk data on a quarterly basis from 2003 to 2007, the significant racial disparities 
uncovered led to the commencement of Floyd, which ultimately resulted in court-
ordered “NYPD reform practices and policies related to stop and frisk to conform with 
the requirements of the [U.S.] Constitution.”.172 
 
Likewise, in Maryland, when the state police, pursuant to a settlement agreement, were 
required to maintain statistics on the race and ethnicity of drivers stopped, racial 
disparities in traffic stops were cut in half.173 In Illinois, where law enforcement agencies 
have been required to document and report traffic stops to the Illinois Department of 
Transportation since 2004, law enforcement agencies are able to assess the effectiveness 
and unintended consequences of their strategies, and compare themselves to each other 
to improve practices.174 A consent decree between New Jersey and the DOJ, which 
required “the design and implementation of management information system to compile 
data on the patterns of enforcement and the outcomes of vehicle stops and searches,” 
led to extensive reforms in the training and supervision of state police troopers. 175 
However, because of data, we know that there is still much work to be done as despite 
seven years under the consent decree, data has shown that the New Jersey State Police 
 
with the communities served by law enforcement, which is important for developing 
collaborative solutions to reduce crime. . . . In contrast, when police do not make data available, 
this frustrates public accountability and effective police work. As a former FBI director put it in 
2015 when responding to a question from a member of Congress about police uses of force, 
“[W]e can’t have an informed discussion because we don’t have data. People have data about 
who went to a movie last weekend or how many books were sold or how many cases of the flu 
walked into an emergency room, and I cannot tell you how many people were shot by police in 
the United States last month, last year, or anything about the demographics, and that’s a very bad 
place to be." 
Id. 
171 Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THIRD REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE 
BY SUFFOLK CTY, POLICE DEP’T (April 18, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download with 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEVENTH REPORT ASSESSING SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT COMPLIANCE BY 
SUFFOLK CTY. POLICE DEP’T (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1103156/download. 
172 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 671; CATALYSTS FOR COLLABORATION, Case Study: 
Floyd v. City of New York, https://catalystsforcollaboration.org/casestudy/nycfloyd.html (last visited Jan. 
2, 2020). 
173 Michael A. Fletcher, The Stop: Racial profiling of drivers leaves legacy of anger and fear, THE 
UNDEFEATED, https://theundefeated.com/features/the-stop-national-geographic-anquan-boldin-racial-
profiling-of-drivers-leaves-legacy-of-anger (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). Note, the racial disparities were cut in 
half after a second lawsuit which compelled the police to revamp their complaint system. Id. 
174 ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS, https://illinoistrafficstops.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2019). 
175 J. Fagan & A.B. Geller, Profiling and Consent: Stops, Searches and Seizures after Soto, Presented at the 




were still involved in a pattern and practice of racially selective enforcement on the New 
Jersey Turnpike and other nearby state highways.176 In Los Angeles, where a report 
revealed that from 2015 to 2018, the LAPD’s Metropolitan Division stopped Black 
drivers “at a rate more than five times their share of the city’s population,”177 the Mayor, 
in response to the data in the report, ordered the LAPD to scale back traffic stops—the 
LAPD scaled back by about eleven percent, and its Metropolitan Division by about 
forty-five percent.178 
 
In the legislative context, North Carolina was the first state in the nation to mandate the 
collection of traffic-stop data. As a result of that law, researchers were able to validate 
the racial profiling concerns of the lawmakers who enacted it: “two-to-one search rates; 
two-to-one increased likelihood of being pulled over if you are nonwhite.”179 A number 
of reforms have been implemented in large part based on the analysis of data that law 
enforcement agencies are statutorily required to produce.180 
 
These examples of data serving as an impetus for better policing practices make a 
compelling case for New York to mandate the collection and analysis of stop data. 
VI. New York’s Driver’s License Suspension Scheme is Vulnerable to 
Possible Legal Challenges 
 
a. Fourteenth Amendment181 
New York’s driver’s license suspension scheme punishes individuals for Traffic Debt—
in other words, it punishes people for poverty. It also disproportionately impacts people 




177 Ben Poston & Cindy Chang, ‘Stop-and-frisk in a car:’ Elite LAPD unit disproportionately stopped black 
drivers, data show, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019 11:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
lapd-traffic-stops-20190124-story.html. 
178 Ben Poston & Cindy Chang, LAPD searches blacks and Latinos more. But they’re less likely to have 
contraband than whites., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-
me-lapd-searches-20190605-story.html; Cindy Chang & Ben Boston, Garcetti orders LAPD to scale back 
vehicle stops amid concerns over black drivers being targeted, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2019, 9:30 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-garcetti-lapd-metro-20190206-story.html. 
179 Isidoro Rodriguez, Why Traffic Stops Don’t Stop Crime, CENTER ON MEDIA CRIME AND JUSTICE AT 
JOHN JAY COLLEGE (July 17, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/07/17/why-traffic-stops-dont-stop-
crime/. 
180 See, e.g., THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, NC Traffic Stops, 
https://fbaum.unc.edu/traffic.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2019). For example, as a result of the North 
Carolina law mandating the collection of traffic-stop data, “several jurisdictions revised their practices . . .  
including requiring officers to obtain written consent before searching a car during a traffic stop.” 
POLICING PROJECT, N.Y.U, supra note 156. 
181 It should be noted that following lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of license-for-payment laws, 
several jurisdictions changed their laws. These jurisdictions include California, Montana, and Virginia.  See, 
e.g., Hernandez v. Cal. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, No. RG16836460 (Super. Ct. of Alameda Cnty., filed 
Oct. 25, 2016) (California); DiFrancesco v. Bullock, No. CV-17-66-BU-SEH (D. Mont., filed Aug. 31, 




i. Fundamental Fairness 
“All people . . . must, so far as the law is concerned, stand on an equality before the bar 
of justice. . . .”182 Indeed, punishing a person “simply because he could not pay [a] fine, 
without considering the reasons for the inability to pay or the propriety of reducing the 
fine or extending the time for payments or making alternative orders,” is “little more 
than punishing a person for his poverty.”183 In a long line of cases in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court has evaluated the impact of money in the justice system, it has eschewed 
the application of the traditional due process and equal protection tiered approach, and 
has instead adopted the more nuanced doctrine of fundamental fairness—a convergence 
of due process and equal protection principles.184 
 
The Court’s fundamental fairness doctrine does not tolerate laws that punish people for 
their inability to pay.185 When considering economic disparities in the justice system, the 
Court’s fundamental fairness approach requires an inquiry into: (1) the nature of the 
individual interest affected and the extent to which it is affected; (2) the rationality of the 
connection between legislative means and purpose; and (3) the existence of alternative 
means for effectuating the purpose.186 This paper analyzes these considerations, as 
applied to New York’s driver’s license suspension scheme, in turn. 
 
First, driver’s licenses are a property right protected by the U.S. Constitution.187 Further, 
“driving an automobile [is] a virtual necessity for most Americans,”188 and thus the 
nature of an individual’s interest in their driver’s license and the extent to which the 
interest is affected could not be more sweeping. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that 
“the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the 
very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity which it was the purpose of the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure.”189 The ability to drive is essential for many people 
to go about their lives and earn a living. When one’s license is suspended for FTP/FTA, 
the individual is outright prohibited from driving and is therefore precluded from going 
about their daily activities and obligations, particularly if they reside in an area with 
 
182 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). The principles from Griffin and its progeny extend beyond 
instances in which a defendant is subject to imprisonment. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 111 (1996). 
183 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671, 674 (1983). Indeed, unpaid fines and fees often result in civil 
judgments, which entail significant human and financial consequences for those who cannot pay because 
of their poverty and therefore blamelessly fail to pay the judgments. People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 
1157, 1167–68 (Ct. App. 2019), review denied (Mar. 27, 2019). The consequences of driver’s license 
suspensions are analogous to, and as serious and punitive as, the consequences that flow from civil 
judgments. Therefore, Traffic Debt suspensions should be analyzed within the same framework as unpaid 
fines and fees that result in civil judgments. 
184 See, e.g., M.L.B, 519 U.S. 102; Bearden, 461 U.S. 660; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12; Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 
235, 259–266 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
185 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67, 670–71; Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th at 1164. 
186 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 260 (Harlan, J., concurring)).  
187 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (“Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that 
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without 
that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”) The Court also recognized that the 
continued possession of a driver’s license can be “essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.” Id. at 539. 
188 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 




limited public transportation options.190 Moreover, a choice between paying a fine which 
one cannot afford to pay and having one’s driver license—which is integral to go about 
one’s life and earn a livelihood—suspended is really no choice at all.191 As one court has 
explained: 
 
[T]he ability to drive is crucial to the debtor’s ability to actually establish the 
economic self-sufficiency that is necessary to be able to pay the relevant 
obligations. . . . [O]ne needs only to observe the details of ordinary life to 
understand that an individual who cannot drive is at an extraordinary 
disadvantage in both earning and maintaining material resources. Suspending a 
driver’s license is therefore not merely out of proportion to the underlying 
purpose of ensuring payment, but affirmatively destructive of that end.”192 
 
Considering that New York’s law can completely deprive people of the judicially 
recognized vital property interest in their driver’s licenses, the nature of the interest and 
the extent to which it is affected indicate that the law should be held to be fundamentally 
unfair. 
 
Second, New York’s license-for-payment law is wholly irrational. The State might argue 
two grounds for rationality—that the law enables it to collect outstanding debt and helps 
to ensure the safety of roads—neither of which would hold up in a rationality analysis. 
 
The fact that nearly half of the Traffic Debt suspensions issued in New York in 2016 
remained in effect one year later193 compels the conclusion that it is impossible, and 
therefore irrational, to expect that the suspending someone’s driver’s license will coerce 
one who cannot afford to pay to do so.194 Save for a sudden and unlikely change in 
financial circumstances, the draconian threat of driver’s license suspension does not 
suddenly give someone who lacks the ability to pay the ability to pay.195 What the Court 
said in Bearden with respect to revoking the probation of indigent defendants is highly 
 
190 See supra Section IV.a. 
191  
The “choice” of paying $100 fine or spending 30 days in jail is really no choice at all to the person 
who cannot raise $100. The resulting imprisonment is no more or no less than imprisonment for 
being poor. To put it in another way and in the context of the present case, when a fine in the 
same amount is imposed upon codefendants deemed equally culpable with the added provision 
for their imprisonment in the event of its nonpayment, an option is given to the rich defendant 
but denied to the poor one. While the poor man has the “right” to obtain his release by payment 
of the fine, in actuality the “right” is meaningless to him. 
In re Antazo, 3 Cal. 3d 100, 108 (1970). This case was approvingly cited by the Bearden Court. Bearden, 
461 U.S. at 664–69 n.6, n.10. 
192 Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-CV-1263, 2017 WL 4418134, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017). 
193 Weiss & Wilner, supra note 4. 
194 Suspending a driver’s license is “affirmatively destructive” to the purpose of ensuring payment. 
Robinson, 2017 WL 4418134, at *9.; People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1164 (Ct. App. 2019), 
review denied (Mar. 27, 2019) (“The laws, moreover, are irrational: they raise no money because people 
who cannot pay do not pay.”). 
195 See, e.g., Robinson, 2017 WL 4418134, at *8 (“No person, however, can be threatened or coerced into 
doing the impossible, and no person can be threatened or coerced into paying money that she does not 




applicable here.196 While punishment, such as imprisonment or driver’s license 
suspension 
 
may indeed spur [individuals] to try hard to pay, . . . [s]uch a goal is fully served 
. . . by [suspending a license] only for persons who have not made sufficient bona 
fide efforts to pay. [Suspending the driver’s license] of someone who through no 
fault of his own is unable to make [payments] will not make [payments] suddenly 
forthcoming. Indeed, such a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the 
[individual] to use illegal means [such as driving with a suspended license] to 
acquire funds to pay in order to avoid [permanent suspension].197 
 
Rather than facilitating the collection of outstanding debt, New York’s driver’s license 
suspension scheme effectively leaves impoverished individuals—who are 
disproportionately people of color—with no choice but to continue driving despite the 
suspension of their license and thus risk getting arrested, charged, and convicted for 
driving with a suspended license. This is counterproductive in that it results in the 
accumulation of more unpayable and uncollectable outstanding traffic-related debt, as 
well as criminal justice debt.198 As one court put it, “taking an individual’s driver’s license 
away to try to make her more likely to pay a fine is not using a shotgun to do the job of a 
rifle: it is using a shotgun to treat a broken arm. There is no rational basis for that.”199 
Although collecting outstanding debt may very well be a legitimate state purpose, a law 
that is so plainly counterproductive to achieving said purpose is not rational. 
 
Further, the law authorizing Traffic Debt suspensions is not rationally related to any 
legitimate state interest in ensuring the safety of roadways. For it to be rationally related 
to such interest, the “underlying law[] would have to draw some distinction based on 
actual expectation of safety risk, such as, for example, a distinction based on the severity 
or numerousness of the underlying offenses.”200 N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) 
authorize suspensions for nonpayments of traffic tickets and nonappearances in traffic 
court— reasons that have absolutely no correlation with driver dangerousness.201 There 
is zero evidence to suggest that drivers who cannot pay traffic tickets and related costs 
pose any more of a risk to drivers around them than drivers who can afford to pay such 
tickets and related costs. In fact, if the law’s purpose is to ensure the safety of roadways, 
the law actually frustrates its own purpose: it makes roadways less safe insofar as it 
inevitably increases the number of unlicensed and uninsured drivers on the road, and 
also makes it much more difficult for drivers who have their license reinstated to procure 
insurance. 202 
 
196 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670–71 (1983). 
197 Id. 
198 See supra Section IV.a–b. 
199 Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-CV-1263, 2017 WL 4418134, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2017). 
200 Id. at *8. 
201 See, e.g., Amunrud v. Bd. of Appeals, 158 Wn. 2d 208, 231 (Wash. 2006) (Sanders, J., dissenting) 
(stating that “revocation of a driver's license for a reason completely unrelated to the only legitimate police 
power justification [(to promote highway safety)] for the license in the first place violates due process” and 
“the legitimate end of licensing drivers to promote highway safety does not justify the means of revoking a 
driver's license to deter delinquency in child support”). 





The law’s lack of a rational relation to the State’s interests in collecting outstanding debt 
and ensuring the safety of roadways counsels that the law should be found 
fundamentally unfair. 
 
Third, several alternative—and more effective—means exist to effectuate the purpose of 
collecting outstanding debt. However, New York’s current statutory framework is 
devoid of options that might make it feasible for low-income individuals to pay the fines 
and fees imposed upon them. 
 
Only if alternate measures are not adequate to meet the State's interests . . .  may 
the court [punish an indigent individual] who has made sufficient bona fide 
efforts to pay. To do otherwise would deprive the [individual] of his . . . freedom 
simply because, through no fault of his own, he cannot pay the fine. Such a 
deprivation would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.203 
 
New York law could allow for reduced, waived, or deferred payments for traffic tickets, 
for instance. Similarly, it could allow for partial payments or payment plans, or 
community service or other alternatives. These options are much more likely to result in 
payment than driver’s license suspensions, especially because such alternatives do not 
necessarily result in the additional financial impediments that suspensions entail. 
 
The existence of ample means for the State to effectuate its purpose further confirms 
that New Yorker’s driver’s license suspension scheme for Traffic Debt should be held to 
be fundamentally unfair. 
 
Moreover, New York courts have recognized the importance of the fundamental fairness 
doctrine, and have applied it robustly to avoid punishing people for their poverty.204 
Specifically, the N.Y. Court of Appeals has held that a judge’s failure to conduct an 
ability to pay analysis prior to issuing an arrest warrant for an unpaid speeding ticket 
violates the Supreme Court’s holding in Bearden.205 Similarly premised on Bearden, a 
New York trial court recently found that “when imposing bail the court must consider 
the defendant's ability to pay and whether there [are] any less restrictive means to achieve 
the State's interest.”206 
 
For these reasons, it can hardly be considered just, let alone constitutional, that New 
York law permits indefinite Traffic Debt suspensions as punishment for “the crime of 
being poor.” The infliction of punishment on individuals solely because of their poverty 
 
203 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983). 
204 California courts have done the same. In January 2019, a California appellate court held that imposing 
fines and fees “upon indigent defendants without a determination that they have the present ability to pay . 
. . [is] fundamentally unfair.” People v. Duenas, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1157, 1169 (Ct. App. 2019), review 
denied (Mar. 27, 2019). 
205 Matter of Hamel, 88 N.Y.2d 317 (1996). 




is not tolerated by the courts.207 As this is precisely what New York’s Traffic Debt 
suspension law does,208 it should be found fundamentally unfair  
 
ii. Equal Protection 
Although the fundamental fairness doctrine—which the Supreme Court developed and 
adopted to evaluate economic disparities in the justice system—should control the 
inquiry, some courts have instead employed a more traditional equal protection analysis. 
If a court were to analyze New York’s Traffic Debt suspension law using the tiered equal 
protection approach, the law would likely be found unconstitutional.209 
 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State 
shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”210 N.Y. 
Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) could be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause for at 
least two reasons. First, a court could find that there is a clear pattern, unexplainable on 
grounds other than race, of a disproportionate impact on people of color, giving rise to a 
strict scrutiny analysis. Second, a court could find that the law treats people who are 
willing but unable to pay more harshly than people who are willing and able to pay, when 




While intent is generally required for a cognizable equal protection claim, “discriminatory 
purpose may be proven through statistics alone”211 where a “clear pattern, unexplainable 
on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the 
governing legislation appears neutral on its face.”212 Inadequate remedial efforts may also 
demonstrate a discriminatory purpose.213 
 
If a court finds the data presented here sufficiently compelling,214 it likely can serve as the 
foundation for an equal protection claim premised on race. Further, when viewed against 
the backdrop of the long history of unequal treatment that people of color have endured 
in New York and throughout the United States,215 the data presented at the outset of this 
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208 See supra Section IV.a–b. 
209 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 449–50 (1985) (while a city can in 
some cases validly deny a permit to a proposed group home if the home would be too big, there was no 
logical connection between that principle and the City’s actions, and thus the Court found that the law did 
not survive rational basis review); Zobel v. Williams 457 U.S. 55, 56–58 (1982) (struck down a program 
that distributed oil money to residents based on length of state residency because the asserted rationales 
did not logically support the law); 
210 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
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2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 
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213 Floyd, 813 F. Supp. at 452–53. 
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paper raises significant questions as to whether N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) could 
survive an equal protection challenge.216 
 
Rational Basis Review 
Even if a court were to apply the most deferential standard—rational basis review—N.Y. 
Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) is likely vulnerable to a judicial finding that it is 
unconstitutional because the law treats similarly situated individuals differently on the 
basis of poverty, and the different treatment fails to rationally further a legitimate 
government interest. 
 
The Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to mean that “all persons similarly 
circumstanced shall be treated alike.”217 If a law treats similarly situated individuals 
differently, and the different treatment is not rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest, the law is violative of the Equal Protection Clause.218 The Court’s well-
established line of precedent dictates that a statute which penalizes defendants based 
solely on their nonpayment of money, without providing for an exception if the 
defendants are willing but unable to pay, is the “constitutional equivalent of a statute that 
specifically imposes a harsher sanction on indigent defendants than on non-indigent 
defendants.”219 Thus, despite judicial reluctance “‘to overturn governmental action on 
the ground that it denies equal protection of the laws,’” when reviewing legislation for a 
rational basis,220 the Court’s precedent indicates that the presumption of rationality does 
not stretch far enough to allow for the disparate treatment of indigent defendants if the 
only goal of the challenged law is to ensure payment and the harsher punishment 
inflicted upon indigent defendants (relative to non-indigent defendants) makes it 
substantially more difficult for indigent defendants to make payment.221 
 
In James v. Strange, for example, the Court found that a state recoupment statute for 
legal defense fees expended for the benefit of indigent defendants failed to evenly treat 
indigent criminal defendants with other classes of debtors and discriminatorily 
“blight[ed]” “the hopes of indigents for self-sufficiency and self-respect.”222 It therefore 
found that the law “embodie[d] elements of punitiveness and discrimination which 
violate[d] the rights of citizens to equal treatment under the law,” and thus upheld the 
injunction enjoining the law’s enforcement.223 
 
 
216 “It is deeply troubling if thousands of New Yorkers are being stopped each year without reasonable  
suspicion, and even more troubling if African–American and Latino New Yorkers are being singled out 
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N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) should be found to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because it treats similarly situated people—people with outstanding traffic-related 
debt—differently based on their ability to pay. More specifically, it punishes poor people 
with the suspension of their driver’s license and the consequences that ensue therefrom, 
but does not inflict such unduly harsh punishment on those with the means to pay. As 
explained throughout this paper, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) permits suspensions 
for FTP/FTA, but does not permit inquiry into the reasons for the nonpayment/ 
nonappearance, consideration of whether the requirement to repay will deprive an 
individual and their family of their livelihood, nor the imposition of alternatives. The loss 
of a driver’s license results in a cascade of hardship—whether it be job loss, additional 
fines, fees, and costs, or a conviction for driving with a suspended license, for 
example224—that people of means completely avoid by paying traffic tickets and related 
costs in full. This kind of discriminatory treatment of similarly situated people is 
proscribed by the Constitution when the treatment does not rationally further a 
legitimate government interest.225 
 
As discussed in depth above, the law should be found to not rationally further any 
legitimate government interest because it does not result in the collection of outstanding 
debt—it is actually counterproductive in that it impedes individuals’ ability to pay the 
fines and fees underlying their Traffic Debt suspensions. Likewise, it does not make 
roads safer; indeed, it actually has the perverse effect of making highways less safe.226 
Therefore, because N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) discriminates between similarly 
situated people, and such discriminatory treatment does not rationally further any 
legitimate government interest, the law should not survive an Equal Protection challenge. 
 
b. Implementing Regulations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial 
assistance.”227 A crucial purpose for which Title VI was enacted was to prevent indirect, 
but nonetheless invidious, discrimination through the use of federal funds.228 Federal 
agencies that are empowered to provide federal financial assistance are authorized and 
directed to effectuate Title VI by issuing rules, regulations, and orders of general 
applicability.229 Federal grants, cooperative agreements, loans, and arrangements to use 
federal property all qualify as federal assistance within the meaning of Title VI.230 If a 
recipient of federal funds fails to comply with any requirement adopted by an agency 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, the agency must first inform the recipient of their 
 
224 See supra Section IV. a–b. 
225 Moreover, any plausible public benefit derived from the law is significantly outweighed by the 
demonstrable harm. This also counsels that the law fails the rational basis test. See Allegheny Pittsburgh 
Coal Co. v. County Commission, 488 U.S. 336, 343–46 (1989); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207 (1982). 
226 See supra Section VI.a.ii. 
227 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
228 See H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 12 (1963); 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (Statement of 
Sen. Humphrey); 110 Cong. Rec. 2468 (1964); 10 Cong. Rec. 7054 (1964) (Statement by Sen. Pastore). 
229 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. 




failure to comply and seek their compliance by voluntary means.231 If the recipient fails 
to comply, the agency is then empowered to seek compliance through the termination of 
assistance or refusal to grant continued assistance, or enforcement proceedings through 
the courts.232 
 
“Most [f]ederal agencies have adopted regulations that prohibit recipients of [f]ederal 
funds from using criteria or methods of administering their programs that have the 
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination based on race, color, or national 
origin.”233 Such regulations permissibly prohibit practices that have a disparate impact on 
protected groups, even if the practices are not intentionally discriminatory,234 and carry 
the full force and effect of law.235 
 
Disparate impact is established by demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that a facially neutral policy has a disparate impact on a protected group, in violation of 
federal agency regulations, without a “substantial legitimate justification.”236 The 
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consequences of the allegedly discriminatory practice, rather than the motivations for it, 
are the focus of disparate impact inquiry.237 
 
i. New York Accepts Federal Funds 
New York State, its subdivisions, and its municipalities receive federal funding; thus, they 
must comply with funding agency regulations that implement Title VI. If they do not 
comply, complaints may be filed with the relevant funding agencies, which then 
investigate the complaints and take appropriate action to ensure compliance. 
 
In 2019, New York, its subdivisions, and its municipalities were collectively awarded 
$180.1 billion in prime awards from federal agencies.238 Notably and relevant to driver’s 
license suspensions, well over $65 billion of those funds were awarded by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT).239 In 2019, DOT issued more than 3,600 grants 
totaling over $995 million to New York, its subdivisions, and its municipalities.240 The 
New York State DMV received a $647,500 prime award,241 and six sub-awards totaling 
over $27 million242 from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 2019.243 
Moreover, the Governor’s Traffic Safety Committee (GTSC), which serves as a liaison 
with federal government agencies on highway safety programs and policies, receives 
federal funds which it appropriates to the DMV: in 2019, the GTSC received just south 
of $20.5 million in federal funding, in addition to seventeen federally funded full-time 
employees.244 Further, the DOJ issued eighteen Edward Byrne Memorial Justice 
Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG)245 awards totaling $13,502,275 to entities within 
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New York.246 The New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services received 
$8,576,883, with the remaining $4,925,392 going to various localities and their respective 
agencies.247 
 
As New York State, as well as its subdivisions and municipalities, accept these funds 
from the DOT and DOJ, they are required to abide by the agencies’ regulations 
regarding nondiscrimination in federally assisted programs. Per the DOT and DOJ 
regulations that implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, funding recipients 
may not, among other discriminatory actions: 
 
(i) Deny an individual any disposition, service, financial aid, or benefit provided 
under the program; 
(ii) Provide any disposition, service, financial aid, or benefit to an individual 
which is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to 
others under the program; 
(iii) Subject an individual to segregation or separate treatment in any matter 
related to his receipt of any disposition, service, financial aid, or benefit under the 
program; 
(iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any advantage or 
privilege enjoyed by others receiving any disposition, service, financial aid, or 
benefit under the program; 
(v) Treat an individual differently from others in determining whether he satisfies 
any admission, enrollment, quota, eligibility, membership, or other requirement 
or condition which individuals must meet in order to be provided any 
disposition, service, financial aid, function or benefit provided under the 
program; or 
(vi) Deny an individual an opportunity to participate in the program through the 
provision of services or otherwise or afford him an opportunity to do so which is 
different from that afforded others under the program (including the opportunity 
to participate in the program as an employee but only to the extent set forth in 
paragraph (c) of this section). 
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(vii) Deny a person the opportunity to participate as a member of a planning or 
advisory body which is an integral part of the program.248 
 
Further, funding recipients may not “utilize criteria or methods of administration which 
have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or 
national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment 
of the objectives of the program as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or 
national origin.”249 
 
ii. New York’s Driver’s License Suspension Scheme Discriminatorily 
Impacts People of Color 
To establish that a law violates Title VI regulations, it must be demonstrated that the law 
entails a program, policy, or practice that has a “discriminatory impact.”250 “Once such a 
showing has been made, the burden shifts to the [proponent of the law] to demonstrate 
the existence of ‘a substantial legitimate justification’ for the allegedly discriminatory 
practice.”251 If that burden is sustained, the challenger “may still prove his case by 
demonstrating that other less discriminatory means would serve the same objective.”252 
 
The data presented at the outset of this paper demonstrate that New Yorkers of color 
are discriminatorily impacted by N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a).253 To recap: in New 
York City, the driver’s license suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the highest 
concentrations of people of color is two-and-a-half times higher than in the zip codes 
with the most concentrated white populations; outside of New York City, the 
suspension rate in the ten zip codes with the highest concentration of people of color is 
four times higher than in the ten zip codes with the most concentrated white 
populations.254 And, no substantial legitimate justification exists for this discriminatory 
impact imposed by the law. The law is ineffective in collecting outstanding Traffic Debt, 
and also jeopardizes public safety.255 It is therefore devoid of any legitimate justification, 
let alone a substantial one, for the disparate impact it has on people of color. Finally, 
there are several less discriminatory means that would serve the objective of N.Y. Veh. & 
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42.103. 
250 New York Urban League, Inc. v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Georgia 
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Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Board of Education of New York v. Harris, 
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Traf. Law § 510(4-a): the law could allow for reduced, waived, or deferred payments, 
partial payments, payment plans, community service, or other alternatives. 256 These 
means would also more effectively serve to collecting outstanding debt. 
 
For these reasons, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) likely violates 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b) 
and 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b). DOT and the DOJ have affirmative duties under 42 U.S.C. § 
2000d–1 to investigate discriminatory activities that receive federal funds and take 
appropriate enforcement actions to ensure Title VI’s mandate is given effect.257 
Therefore, if New York fails to bring N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) into compliance 
with these regulations, the State, as well as its subdivisions, municipalities, and law 
enforcement agencies stand to lose substantial DOT and DOJ funding and/or face 
enforcement action in court. 
 
c. Eighth Amendment Proscription Against Excessive Fines 
The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract payments, whether 
in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense,’” and applies to, among other 
things, civil in rem forfeiture proceedings.258 “[B]oth the Eighth Amendment and § 10 of 
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which it derives, were intended to prevent the 
government from abusing its power to punish.”259 Thus, the determinative question for 
purposes of whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies is whether the government 
action in question, at least in part, constitutes punishment.260 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court “consistently has recognized that forfeiture serves, at least in 
part, to punish the owner.”261 Like forfeitures, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 510(4-a) serves 
to punish drivers for Traffic Debt. Although the State may aver that the law is a 
collection tool rather than a punishment, research demonstrates that it does not operate 
as a collection tool,262 and actually punishes people with suspending their driving 
privileges (and the consequences that flow from not having a valid license) for 
nonpayment.263 Indeed, that driver’s license suspensions were first introduced, in part, 
for the purpose of “punishing unsafe drivers” evinces that driver’s licenses are, in fact, 
intended to be punitive.264 Even if the law were found to be a collection tool, a court 
could find that it simultaneously serves as punishment (as it does), which renders the 
 
256 See supra Section VI.a.ii. 
257 Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215, 1221 (D.D.C. 1976) (citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 
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258 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610–11 (1993) (quoting Browning–Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. 
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goals.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
261 Id. at 618. 
262 In New York, nearly half of the traffic suspensions issued in 2016 remained in effect one year later, 
indicating that suspensions do not serve the purpose of collecting outstanding traffic debt. Weiss & 
Wilner, supra note 4. 
263 See supra Section IV.a–b. 




Excessive Fines Clause applicable.265 Further, the law undoubtedly serves a deterrent 
penal purpose, which gives rise to the inference that it is punitive, because it effectively 
uses driver’s license suspensions as a means to deter people from not paying or 
appearing to contest traffic tickets.266 Moreover, a driver’s license is a property right 
protected by the U.S. Constitution,267 which is essentially forfeited upon the suspension 
of a driver’s license. Thus, at a minimum, driver’s license suspensions are analogous to 
civil forfeitures, thereby warranting the same Eighth Amendment protections against 
government encroachment.268 
 
In February 2019, the Supreme Court unanimously incorporated the Eighth 
Amendment’s Excessive Fine Clause, making it applicable to states and their 
subdivisions.269 The Court determined that “[p]rotection against excessive punitive 
economic sanctions secured by the Clause is, . . . both ‘fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty’ and ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.’”270 In reaching 
its determination to incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court traced back the 
roots of the Clause to Magna Carta, which required “that economic sanctions ‘be 
proportioned to the wrong’ and ‘not be so large as to deprive [an offender] of his 
livelihood.’”271 Furthermore, the Court suggested that courts ought to pay particularly 
close attention when evaluating whether punishments used to generate revenue for state 
and local government are excessive.272 It explained that “[e]xorbitant [fines] undermine 
other constitutional liberties,” and are sometimes employed by governments “‘in a 
measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence,’ for ‘fines are a 
source of revenue,’ while other forms of punishment ‘cost a State money.’”273 
 
As an initial matter, Traffic Debt suspensions too often result in the deprivation of 
peoples’ livelihoods. As discussed above, research shows that suspensions lead to job 
loss and lost job opportunities.274 Further, New York’s driver’s license suspension 
scheme makes it exceedingly difficult for many to regain their livelihoods post-
suspension for it makes it practically cost prohibitive, relative to the resources of those 
who are issued Traffic Debt suspensions, for many people to get their licenses reinstated. 
In addition to the costly underlying fines, fees, and surcharges, there is a $70 per 
suspension STF, which must be paid in a lump sum along with the underlying fines to 
 
265 Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (“[S]anctions frequently serve more than one purpose. We need not exclude the 
possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is subject to the limitations of the 
Excessive Fines Clause.”). 
266 Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 689 (2019) (noting that deterrence is a penal goal). 
267 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). 
268 See State v. Timbs, 134 N.E.3d 12, 21 (Ind. 2019) (“When a civil forfeiture is even partly punitive, it 
implicates the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive fines.”). 
269 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. 682 (citations omitted). However, the Court did not unanimously agree upon the 
vehicle through which the Clause should be incorporated. 
270 Id. at 689 (citation omitted). 
271 Id. at 688 (citation omitted).  
272 Id. (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979, n. 9 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.) (“it makes sense 
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274 See supra Section IV.a. See also Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (pursuit of an 
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have one’s license reinstated.275 The law’s effect of depriving individuals of their 
livelihood suggests an Excessive Fines Clause violation. 
 
The Court, in its historical analysis, elucidated that even though thirty-five out of thirty-
seven states had ratified excessive fines provisions in their constitutions by 1868, abuses 
still continued: 
 
Following the Civil War, Southern States enacted Black Codes to subjugate newly 
freed slaves and maintain the prewar racial hierarchy. Among these laws' 
provisions were draconian fines for violating broad proscriptions on ‘vagrancy’ 
and other dubious offenses. When newly freed slaves were unable to pay 
imposed fines, States often demanded involuntary labor instead.276 
 
Black Codes used fines to subject people of color to involuntary servitude.277 The use of 
fines to coerce involuntary labor was discussed at length during congressional debates 
over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment, and other similar 
measures.278 The modern-day practice of punishing people for Traffic Debt bears a 
disturbing resemblance to the use of Black Codes,279 which have long been held 
unconstitutional.280 The data presented281 and consequences of driver’s license 
suspensions discussed earlier in this paper282 evince the existence of a coercive Traffic 
Debt suspensions infrastructure that unduly subjugates people of color. Given the 
importance the architects of our constitutional framework have assigned to the 
prohibition of excessive fines throughout the development of our democracy, and their 
use against people of color in the post-Reconstruction Era, a scheme that 
disproportionately (and excessively) punishes people of color, and does so for their 
inability to pay, should not survive constitutional muster, assuming of course that a court 
finds that the Excessive Fines Clause applies. 
 
 
275 See supra Section I and IV.a. 
276 Timbs, 139 S. Ct. at 688–89, (2019) (internal citations omitted). 
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black work force and limit its economic options apart from planation labor.’” Id. at 697 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in judgment) (citation omitted). 
278 Id. at 689 (citations omitted). 
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judgment) (citation omitted.) An Alabama law was criticized for “almost reenacting slavery” by, “among 
other harsh inflictions” imposing a $50 fine and [six] months’ imprisonment on any servant or laborer who 
loitered away his time or was stubborn or refractory. Id. at 697–98 (citation omitted). A Florida vagrancy 
law afforded judges the discretion to punish those convicted with a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment 
for up to twelve months, or “by being sold for a term not exceeding twelve months.” Id. at 698 (citation 
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Once the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the Excessive Fine Clause was an 
incorporated protection applicable to the states, it remanded the case to the Indiana 
Supreme Court. The Indiana Supreme Court had to determine, among other things, the 
proper standard by which courts should assess whether in rem forfeitures are excessive. 
To do so, the court analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior precedent,283 which led it to 
conclude that gross proportionality is the proper standard to apply to determine whether 
an in rem forfeiture is excessive.284 Though only useful as persuasive authority outside of 
Indiana, the court explained: 
 
To conduct a proportionality analysis at all, we need to consider the 
punishment's magnitude. And the owner's economic means—relative to the 
property's value [or fine]—is an appropriate consideration for determining that 
magnitude. To hold the opposite would generate a new fiction: that taking away 
the same piece of property [or demanding the same fine] from a billionaire and 
from someone who owns nothing else punishes each person equally.285 
  
The court elaborated that the “historical roots of the Excessive Fines Clause” command 
a focus on the economic effects a fine has on the punished individual. “Magna Carta—
from which the [Excessive Fines] Clause derives—specifically contemplated an 
economic sanction's effect on the wrongdoer, requiring ‘that [fines] be proportioned to 
the offense and that they should not deprive a wrongdoer of his livelihood.’”286 The 
court therefore concluded that to determine if a forfeiture is excessive, the effect of the 
forfeiture on the owner must be considered.287 
 
The N.Y. Court of Appeals has agreed with the Indiana Supreme Court’s interpretation. 
When considering whether a punitive forfeiture is grossly disproportional so as to violate 
the Excessive Fines Clause, the Court considers, among other things, both “the 
seriousness of the crime [or violation] . . . [and] the economic circumstances of the 
defendant.” 288 Furthermore, the Court has explicitly stated that “the forfeiture of an 
automobile for a minor traffic infraction such as driving with a broken taillight or failing 
to signal would surely be ‘grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's 
offense.’”289 The Court continued: “By encompassing many minor and technical 
violations that could not justify forfeiture, the ordinance, as enacted, risks violation of 
 
283 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
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285 Id. at 36. 
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2 Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of 
George II 46–47 (2d ed. 1829)). 
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288 Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 140 (2003) (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334). Additionally, 
New York courts consider “the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant 
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the Excessive Fines Clause.” 290 Considering that the effect of an automobile forfeiture 
and the suspension of a driver’s license is in essence the same—the impacted individual 
is deprived of the ability to drive—it follows that a New York court would likely find 
that the suspension of a driver’s license for a nonappearance or nonpayment related to 
“a minor traffic infraction such as driving with a broken taillight or failing to signal” 
violates the Excessive Fines Clause. 
  
New York law currently requires neither a determination regarding whether payment 
would deprive an individual of their livelihood, nor a determination of an individual’s 
ability to pay in any stage that leads to a Traffic Debt suspension. Therefore, the 
proportionality of the punishment relative to the individual is never assessed. If it were, 
in many instances, the suspension of a driver’s license would likely be found excessive. 
This is obviously problematic, particularly given that throughout New York, the driver’s 
license suspension rate in the ten poorest zip codes is nearly nine times higher than the 
suspension rate in the ten wealthiest zip codes.291 The gravity of this issue is 
compounded particularly for low-income people because the practical effect of their 
driver’s license suspension is permanent suspension due to the mass accumulation of 
fines, fees, surcharges, and other costs that attach thereto, which they will unlikely be 
able to pay. If a court were to find the Excessive Fines Clause applicable, the current law 
is also problematic to the extent that it punishes people without consideration of their 
economic circumstances, contrary to New York jurisprudence.292 Likewise, it fails to 
account for the lack of serious circumstances that underlie Traffic Debt suspensions. 
Surely, driving while intoxicated is more serious than not paying a traffic ticket or 
appearing in court to contest it, yet they are both punishable with license suspensions. 
 
In brief, it is difficult (if not impossible) to conceive of a world in which indefinite 
driver’s license suspension could be found a proportional punishment for Traffic Debt, 
which people—through no fault of their own—lack the means to pay. Similarly, it is 
difficult (if not impossible) to justify that people of means, relative to their resources, 
suffer little to no harm when faced with traffic tickets and related costs, whereas low-
income people face a cascading snowball effect that results in a mountain of debt and 
permanent driver’s license suspension. Because New York law does not require 
consideration of an individual’s economic circumstances prior to suspension, if a court 
were to find the Excessive Fines Clause applicable, it should also find that many driver’s 
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Disturbingly, disproportionate traffic stops and traffic-stop outcomes for people of color 
have been the reality in too many localities and states throughout the nation for decades. 
For instance, a 1999 study conducted in Akron, Columbus, Dayton, and Toledo, Ohio 
concluded that Black drivers were about twice as likely to get tickets as those who are 
not Black.293 Similarly, a study exposing egregious racial disparities conducted in New 
Jersey between 1988 and 1991 led a court to conclude that there was unrebutted 
statistical evidence of disproportionate traffic stops against Black motorists, which 
established a de facto policy of targeting Black motorists for investigation and arrest, 
thus proving selective enforcement violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.294 A lawsuit brought in Maryland predicated on very similar and troubling data, 
such as the fact Black people made up over seventy percent of all of those stopped and 
searched even though Black people made up just seventeen percent of the driving 
population on the relevant highway,295 settled in favor of plaintiffs.296 The appendices 
that follow detail more recent data from various jurisdictions that highlight racial 
disparities in traffic stops and traffic-stop outcomes. 
 
Appendix A 
People of color across the country are disproportionately subjected to traffic stops 
by law enforcement. 
 
Greensboro, North Carolina 
The New York Times analyzed tens of thousands of traffic stops conducted from 2010 
to 2015 in Greensboro, North Carolina. Despite making up just thirty-nine percent of 
the driving-age population, Black drivers constituted fifty-four percent of the drivers 
pulled over. Further, most of that fifty-four percent were stopped for regulatory or 
equipment violations, offenses which police officers have discretion to ignore.297 
 
Furthermore, an analysis of data collected from twenty million traffic stops throughout 
the entire state of North Carolina confirmed that on a state-wide level, Black drivers are 
about ninety-five percent more likely than white drivers to be stopped.298 
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Los Angeles, California 
In Los Angeles, about nine percent of the population is Black; yet, of the 385,000+ 
drivers and passengers pulled over by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) from 
July 2018 through April 2019, twenty-seven percent were Black. In sharp contrast, about 
twenty-eight percent of the City is white and only eighteen percent of those subjected to 
LAPD traffic stops were white. A telling indicator of pretextual stops being used against 
people of color for reasons unrelated to traffic safety, an equipment violation was listed 
as the reason for the stop for over twenty percent of the traffic stops involving Black 
and Latinx people, but only for eleven percent of the traffic stops involving white 
people.299 
 
An earlier report by the Los Angeles Times revealed that from 2015 to 2018, the 
LAPD’s Metropolitan Division stopped Black drivers “at a rate more than five times 
their share of the city’s population.” In South Los Angeles, in which approximately 
thirty-one of the population is Black, sixty-five percent of the Metropolitan Division’s 
stops were of Black drivers.300 
 
Further, a California Department of Justice report recently revealed that throughout the 
state, Black individuals accounted for about fifteen percent of the stops examined, while 
accounting for only six percent of the state population.301 
 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
In 2018, Minneapolis police officers stopped 7,195 cars for equipment violations. 
Although the Black population in Minneapolis is 18.8 percent, 54.8 percent (or 3,940) of 
those drivers stopped were Black.302 This is one indicator that pretextual stops are used 
against people of color not as means to promote public safety, but rather simply on the 
basis of race. 
 
 
299 Ben Poston & Cindy Chang, LAPD searches blacks and Latinos more. But they’re less likely to have 
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Illinois law enforcement agencies conducted 2,272,384 traffic stops involving Black, 
Latinx, Asian, and white drivers. While Black individuals made up about fourteen 
percent of the populations, they accounted for twenty-four percent of these traffic stops. 
Conversely, white drivers were not disproportionately stopped relative to their share of 
the population: they make up about sixty-four percent of the population, and accounted 
for fifty-eight percent of the stops.303 This means that about 30.12 percent of the Black 
population in Illinois experienced a traffic stop in 2017, while only about 16.26 percent 
of the white population in Illinois was subjected to a traffic stop. Also, interestingly, 
traffic stops in Chicago more than tripled from 2015 to 2017 and Black drivers account 
for the majority of this substantial increase in traffic stops.304 Between 2016 and 2017, 
Black drivers accounted for almost two thirds of Chicago’s traffic stops.305 
 
Nashville, Tennessee 
Between 2011 and 2015, the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department stopped an 
average of 1,122 per 1,000 Black drivers—this amounts to more Black drivers than even 
lived within the county during the relevant timeframe. Black drivers made up just 27.6 
percent of the total driving-age population but accounted for 39.3 of traffic stops, 
whereas white drivers, who accounted for 63.8 percent of the driving-age population, 
accounted for only 55.5 of all traffic stops. Thus, Black drivers in Nashville were stopped 
at 1.6 times the rate of white drivers. Furthermore, between 2015 and 2016, Black drivers 
were 113 percent more likely than white drivers to be stopped two and five times. Even 
more troubling, Black drivers were 374 percent more likely than white drivers to be 
stopped between six and ten times between 2015 and 2016.306 This evinces the existence 
of significantly heavier policing in communities of color. 
 
Appendix B  
People of color across the country disproportionately suffer disproportionately 
harsh outcomes incident to traffic stops. 
 
Kansas City, Missouri 
An analysis of traffic tickets issued in 2017 by the Kansas City Police Department 
processed by the Kansas City Municipal Court demonstrated significant racial disparities. 
While Black individuals made up just thirty percent of the population, they received sixty 
percent of the traffic tickets, while white individuals, who make up fifty-nine percent of 
the population, received just thirty-seven percent of the tickets. Moreover, a single 
Kansas City zip code—where ninety-one percent of the population is —“is the most 
 
303 ILLINOIS TRAFFIC STOPS, https://illinoistrafficstops.com/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2019). Other races were 
excluded from the study “because the counts reported for these races were mostly too small to check for 
any sort of significance.” Id. 
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common home zip code [in the City] for Kansas Citians receiving tickets.” Finally, the 
top traffic ticket charges for Black individuals in Kansas City are poverty-related 
offenses, such as the not having insurance and having expired tags.307  
 
Connecticut 
Connecticut law requires the analysis of all traffic stops for all police departments within 
the state.308 An analysis published in 2015 demonstrated that Black and Latinx motorists 
are eleven to forty-one percent more likely to be ticketed than white offenders for the 
most common moving violations—speeding, traffic-light violations, and stop-sign 
violations—even when stopped for the same offense. It also showed that racial 
disparities also exist for equipment violations, such as defective lights, license-plate 
problems, and tinted windows: While Black motorists were ticketed in fifteen percent of 
these stops and Latinx motorists ticketed in eighteen percent of these stops, white 
motorists were only ticketed in nine percent of these stops.309 
 
An analysis of 2017 Connecticut police department data found strong, statistically 
significant disparities in how people of color were treated following a traffic stop.310 
There was strong evidence that motorists of color were treated differently than their 
white non-Latinx counterparts across the state, even when stopped for the same 
reason.311 This evidence included that police disproportionately pull over Black and 
Latinx drivers during daylight hours, when officers can more easily see who is behind the 
wheel. 
 
Further, the 2017 data for City of Derby and Town of Fairfield demonstrate that in both 
places, people of color are more likely to receive a misdemeanor summons—a much 
harsher outcome when compared to the alternatives of an infraction or a warning—as a 
percentage of their total stops.312 In Derby, Black and Latinx drivers were more than 
twice as likely to be issued a misdemeanor summons following a traffic stop than white 
drivers: 23.22 percent of Black drivers stopped and 19.49 percent of Latinx drivers 
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stopped received a misdemeanor summons as a result of the stop, whereas only 9.49 
percent of white drivers stopped received a misdemeanor summons.313 In Fairfield, 12.20 
percent of Black drivers stopped and 11.23 percent of Latinx drivers stopped received a 
misdemeanor summons as a result of the stop, whereas only 2.7 percent of white drivers 
stopped received a misdemeanor summons.314 And, almost forty-one percent of the 
misdemeanor summons issued were for operation of a vehicle with a suspended or 
revoked license; ninety-two percent of all misdemeanor summons issued were for 
offenses that are often inextricably connected to poverty.315 
 
California 
A 2016 study of traffic violations in California’s Bay Area counties concluded that Black 
and Latinx drivers were significantly more likely to be jailed for failure to pay an 
infraction ticket.316 It found that white divers were, on average, half as likely to be 
booked for failure to pay, while black drivers were four to sixteen times more likely to be 
jailed for failure to pay traffic fines.317  
 
Between 2013 and 2015, Black individuals accounted for thirty-three percent of those 
arrested on FTP/FTA warrants in Los Angeles County, yet made up only 9.2 percent of 
the population. During that time period, 20,000 people were arrested and charged by the 
L.A. County Sheriff’s Department for FTP/FTA; eighty-five percent of those 20,000 
people arrested were Black and Latinx. Also during that time frame in San Francisco, 
when 5.8 percent of the population was Black, Black individuals accounted for 48.7 
percent of the FTP/FTA arrests; this stands in stark contrast to the fact that whites, who 
accounted for 41.2 percent of San Francisco’s population, constituted only 22.7 percent 
of the arrests for traffic warrants.318 
 
Cleveland, Ohio 
A 2009 study of traffic citations in Cleveland, Ohio demonstrated that while Black 
individuals represented 38.4 percent of the driving population, they disproportionately 
shouldered fifty-nine percent of the traffic citations issued that year. Black motorists 
were 2.55 times as likely, and motorists of other racial groups 1.8 times as likely, to be 
ticketed by police as white motorists. Black motorists received seventy-nine percent of 
the citations issued for driving with a suspended license, and sixty-one percent of the 
citations issued for seatbelt violations. Based on their proportion of the driving 
population, this made Black motorists 7.63 times as likely to be ticketed for driving with 
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An analysis of 2015 traffic-stop outcomes in Nashville, Tennessee concluded that Black 
drivers are overrepresented in all traffic-stop outcomes: though representing only 27.8 
percent of the driving-age population, Black drivers accounted for forty to fifty-six 
percent of all warnings, traffic tickets, state citations, and arrests following traffic stops. 
Further, the risk of receiving a state citation was 8.4 times greater for Latinx drivers and 
3.1 greater for Black drivers than white drivers, and the majority of state citations issued 
to Latinx drivers were related to driving without a license. 320 
 
Iowa 
Studies of traffic stops in Iowa have found that Black individuals are disproportionately 
ticketed and arrested, and much less likely than their white counterparts to have a stop 
end with a warning. In Linn County, Black drivers are twenty-five percent more likely 
than white drivers to receive a citation, rather than a warning, when stopped for a traffic 
violation. In Scott County, Black drivers are twice as likely than white drivers to be 
arrested after stopped for a traffic violation. In the City of Waterloo, Black drivers are 
substantially more likely to be arrested incident to a traffic stop, and substantially less 
likely to receive a mere warning, than white drivers.321 
 
Chicago, Illinois 
A ProPublica report found that thousands of mostly black drivers are filing for 
bankruptcy to cope with Traffic Debt. The report found that the issuance of tickets for 
failing to have a required vehicle sticker disproportionately impacted Black communities: 
the ten Chicago communities with the highest rates of sticker ticketing between 2011 
and 2015 are more than eighty percent Black. It further found that duplicate tickets for 
sticker violations were disproportionately issued in Black neighborhoods—“more 
citations were issued, per household, in low-income [B]lack neighborhoods than 
anywhere else.” Inferentially then, Black individuals represent a disproportionate share of 
the roughly $275 million owed for sticker tickets issued between 2012 and 2018.322 
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